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Abstract
Using novel microdata, we document an important, unintended consequence of the Protestant
Reformation: a reallocation of resources from religious to secular purposes. To understand this
process, we propose a conceptual framework in which the introduction of religious competi-
tion shifts political markets where religious authorities provide legitimacy to rulers in exchange
for control over resources. Consistent with our framework, religious competition changed the
balance of power between secular and religious elites: secular authorities acquired enormous
amounts of wealth from monasteries closed during the Reformation, particularly in Protestant
regions. This transfer of resources had significant consequences. First, it shifted the alloca-
tion of upper-tail human capital. Graduates of Protestant universities increasingly took secu-
lar, especially administrative, occupations. Protestant university students increasingly studied
secular subjects, especially degrees that prepared students for public sector jobs, rather than
church sector-specific theology. Second, it affected the sectoral composition of fixed invest-
ment. Particularly in Protestant regions, new construction shifted from religious toward secu-
lar purposes, especially the building of palaces and administrative buildings, which reflected
the increased wealth and power of secular lords. Reallocation was not driven by pre-existing
economic or cultural differences. Our findings indicate that the Reformation played an impor-
tant causal role in the secularization of the West.
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I INTRODUCTION
How does religious competition influence the allocation of resources between religious and secu-
lar uses? In this paper, we study the paradigmatic case of the Protestant Reformation: the moment
when the most powerful institution in Western Europe—the Catholic Church—experienced a pro-
found competitive shock. We document how the introduction of religious competition during the
Reformation transformed the European economy, sharply shifting the allocation of resources from
religious to secular uses. We argue that the interaction between religious competition and politics
was critical to this process.
Prior research on religious competition focuses on the relationship between producers and con-
sumers of religion in a market for salvation (Iannaccone, 1998; Ekelund et al., 2006; Iyer, 2016). We
argue that the introduction of religious competition crucially affects a second market—in which
state authorities secure political legitimacy from religious elites (Rubin, 2017). Introducing this
missing market generates novel hypotheses. First, competition should induce resource realloca-
tion away from the church sector and towards secular uses. Second, competition should drive
resource reallocation towards uses specifically favored by secular rulers. We examine rich mi-
crodata on the allocation of resources in early modern Germany, and find evidence supporting
both hypotheses.1 While the Reformation was a religious movement, we find that its unintended
consequence was to promote economic secularization: a significant shift in the balance of power
toward secular authorities, and a sharp and immediate reallocation of resources toward secular
purposes.
We present a conceptual framework that captures a core feature of religion in history: the role
in legitimizing political elites (Weber, 1978; North et al., 2009). Within our framework, the pre-
Reformation era can be understood as an equilibrium in which a monopolist religious producer
(the Catholic Church) provided political legitimacy to secular authorities at a high price—charged
in the form of control over resources, tax exemptions, and some degree of political power.2 The
1We use “Germany” as a short-hand to refer to the German-speaking lands of the Holy Roman Empire.
2Even before the Reformation, rulers in early modern Europe were arguably less reliant on political legitimation by
religious authorities than rulers in, for example, the Islamic world or in earlier periods in Europe history (Rubin, 2017).
We discuss the pre-Reformation equilibrium in the market for legitimacy in further detail below.
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Reformation represented a competitive shock in the market for salvation, as studied by Ekelund
et al. (2006): Protestant reformers offered a popular, lower-cost alternative to the Catholic Church.
Crucially, this shock to the market for salvation also impacted the market for political legitimacy.
During the Reformation, the value of Catholic legitimacy fell and the bargaining power of secular
rulers vis-a`-vis religious elites rose. Protestant reformers’ need to strike a bargain with secular
lords meant that they would accept a lower price in exchange for conferring legitimacy. Where
Protestants were willing to grant secular authorities extensive control of church resources, the
need to maintain doctrinal consistency restricted the bargains Catholics could offer.
The posited new equilibrium in the market for legitimacy has implications for the allocation of
resources between secular and religious uses. Increased labor demand by enriched and empow-
ered rulers, and the decline in clerical services required for salvation in Protestant theology, will
reduce church-sector labor demand relative to the secular sector. As a consequence, returns to in-
vestments in human capital specific to church careers will fall and forward-looking students will
shift their human capital investments accordingly. Shifts in resources toward secular authorities
will also be reflected in fixed investments, such as large scale urban construction, which embody a
full set of factors of production. The new equilibrium will also have implications for the allocation
of resources within the secular sector: specifically, resources will shift toward uses that reflect the
enhanced bargaining power of secular rulers.
We begin to evaluate these hypotheses by documenting the new equilibrium in the market
for political legitimacy in the years after 1517, when Martin Luther first circulated his famous
95 Theses. As indicators of the shifting bargain between secular and religious authorities, we ex-
amine the expropriation of monasteries and wealth transfers from the Catholic Church to secular
lords. Qualitative and quantitative evidence show sharp reallocations toward secular control of
resources—not just a transfer from Catholic church uses to Protestant ones. Transfers of resources
from the control of church elites to secular lords occurred in both Catholic and Protestant territo-
ries, but were particularly pronounced in the latter.
We then directly test the implications of our framework for resource allocation using rich mi-
crodata. We assemble new, highly disaggregated data on the degrees received by, and occupa-
tional outcomes of, German university graduates, and on construction events at the town-by-year
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level, across over 2,000 German towns. We distinguish between religious and secular human capi-
tal investments, occupations, and fixed capital investments. Specifically, we assign to the religious
sector the study of theology; taking a position as a monk, priest, etc.; and the construction of a
church. We assign to the secular sector, non-theological degrees; occupations in public adminis-
tration and the private sector; and the construction of a palace, hospital, or merchant hall.3 Our
data also allow us to test for shifts within the secular sector between uses favored by state author-
ities and other private uses.
To study the market for highly skilled labor, we examine individual-level data on the ca-
reer choices of university graduates before and during the Reformation.4 We show that during
the Reformation, graduates from Protestant universities shifted toward secular occupations, and
away from religious ones (e.g., becoming city councillors or guild masters, rather than priests or
monks).5 We find no pre-Reformation differences in occupational choice trends between univer-
sities that would become Protestant and those that would remain Catholic. Our results reflect the
transmission of the shock to the market for religion into effects on the labor market.6 Reflecting the
new political economy equilibrium, we specifically find an increase in administrative jobs among
graduates from Protestant universities.
A second implication of the new equilibrium is the allocation of forward-looking students’
human capital investments away from church-specific degrees, toward secular ones. Indeed, we
find that immediately after the start of the Reformation, individuals at Protestant universities
reallocated their human capital investments away from theology degrees, and toward the study
of more general, secular subjects.7 The data are consistent with the Reformation playing a causal
3Our classification of religious and secular sectors of the economy includes some areas of ambiguity: for example,
hospitals were funded and staffed by both religious and secular agents. We discuss the implications of such ambiguity
further below.
4The important roles played by human capital elites in European history have been explored by Mokyr (2009);
Cantoni and Yuchtman (2014); Squicciarini and Voigtla¨nder (2015); Dittmar and Meisenzahl (2017). We build on their
work by discussing a specific source of variation in university students’ selection into fields of study and careers.
5Particularly in light of Protestant attacks on Catholic Church corruption, this result calls to mind of work by Mur-
phy et al. (1991), who study the allocation of talent between a rent-seeking and productive sector. We focus here on
documenting the reallocation of resources across sectors, leaving the study of efficiency or productivity consequences
to future work.
6Note that the causal effect of the Reformation on occupational choice reflects both changes in labor supply and
changes in labor demand.
7See Altonji et al. (2012) for a contemporary analysis of how students’ college major choices are affected by expecta-
tions of future labor market outcomes.
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role in driving educational choices: we do not observe pre-Reformation declines in the study
of theology or pre-Reformation differences in degrees granted between universities that would
become Protestant and those that would remain Catholic. We additionally find significant shifts
towards degrees in law and arts, subjects that differentially prepared students for careers in public
administration.
We finally consider a third measure of resource allocation: major construction events as sum-
mary statistics for the allocation of bundles of resources, embodying land, physical, financial, and
human capital. During the Reformation new construction events shifted from religious purposes
toward secular ones (e.g., from churches to administrative buildings and lords’ palaces). Figure I,
panel A, shows a pivot from church sector construction to secular sector construction precisely at
the time of the Reformation. This sectoral reallocation away from church uses occurred differen-
tially more in Protestant territories, as we document below. Again, the evidence is consistent with
the Reformation playing a causal role: we find no evidence of a pre-Reformation shift toward
secular construction, or of differential pre-Reformation trends in construction between Catholic
and Protestant territories. Consistent with our conceptual framework, Figure I, panel B, shows
that within the category of secular construction, there was a sharp pivot precisely toward the uses
favored by empowered secular lords: the construction of palaces and administrative buildings.
The disaggregated nature of our construction data allows us to test an additional hypothesis:
to the extent that the resource reallocation we observe was ultimately driven by religious compe-
tition, one would expect to observe larger differences in construction between Protestant regions
and Catholic regions far from Protestant lands—the latter being exposed to less religious compe-
tition than Catholic lands on a Protestant border (Ekelund et al., 2006 emphasize the importance
of such spatial variation in religious competition). Indeed, we find a larger shift toward secular
construction in comparing Protestant regions to Catholic regions far from a Protestant border than
in a comparison with Catholic regions close to a Protestant border.
Our construction data also allow us to rule out competing explanations for our findings. One
alternative to our proposed political economy mechanism is that what appears to be secularization
is a mere relabeling of activities that were simply transferred from Catholic Church jurisdiction to
Protestant secular lords. For example, historical construction supporting social service provision is
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difficult to assign definitively to the religious or secular sectors. However, when we disaggregate
secular construction into finer categories, we do not observe a shift in construction for potentially
ambiguous social service provision during the Reformation; we see a shift in unambiguously sec-
ular construction (lords’ palaces and administrative buildings, as suggested by Figure I, panel B).
Another alternative is that the apparent secularization reflects the transfer of spending commit-
ments to religious warfare conducted by secular authorities. However, in our analysis of finer
categories of secular construction, we observe no shift in military construction through 1600.
In assessing whether the Reformation played a causal role in driving sectoral reallocation one
first worries about unobserved differences between eventually-Protestant and Catholic territories
and universities. However, it is unlikely that territory- or university-specific unobservables ex-
plain our findings: territories and universities that would become Protestant exhibit no significant
differences in human and physical capital investment trends prior to the Reformation.8
Another natural concern is that time-varying and territory-specific unobservables may have
driven both the adoption of Protestantism and the reallocation of resources toward secular pur-
poses. A large literature documents a wave of urban support for the Reformation and that cities
were key locations where reformist ideas and constituencies developed (Ozment, 1975; Hamm,
1994). One might wonder whether cities at the leading edge of the Reformation drive our find-
ings. However, we find virtually identical results when we limit our analysis to small towns. An-
other possibility is that changes in economic conditions drove both the adoption of Protestantism
and secularization. To explore this possibility, we examine a set of territories where the timing of
adoption was plausibly exogenous—due to unanticipated changes in rulers. We find that within
these territories, where the timing of religious change was independent of underlying economic
conditions, the same pattern of reallocation ensues.
Our findings provide new empirical evidence on the links among the Reformation, seculariza-
tion, and economic change. Ekelund et al. (2006) link the Reformation to growth via secularization,
focusing on the market for salvation and arguing that the Reformation shifted resources from the
8The question of why particular territorial lords adopted the Protestant religion is an important one, addressed
in Cantoni (2012), Rubin (2014), and Curuk and Smulders (2016). Our findings of parallel pre-Reformation trends
in monastery closures, occupational choices, human capital investments, and construction activity, discussed below,
suggest that the sources of variation in adoption were generally not associated with our outcomes of interest prior to
the Reformation.
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Catholic Church directly to the private sector in the 16th century.9 Rubin (2017) suggests another
crucial dimension, arguing that the Reformation was associated with the emergence of a more
secular political economy, particularly in Protestant regions. He specifically highlights the historic
association between secularization and growth, contrasting Europe with the Islamic world (see
also Chaney, 2008 and Kuran, 2011). Our work conceptually synthesizes Ekelund et al. (2006)
and Rubin (2017) and quantitatively tests hypotheses from the resulting framework. Supporting
both Ekelund et al. (2006) and Rubin (2017), we provide the first quantitative empirical evidence
identifying the Reformation as playing a causal role in the emergence of a more secular society in
Protestant Europe. Our finding that the Reformation in fact shifted resources to the state (i.e., ter-
ritorial lords) underscores the interaction of religion and politics, as suggested by our conceptual
framework and by Rubin (2017). It suggests a different (perhaps complementary) path leading
from the Reformation to growth from that emphasized by Ekelund et al. (2006).10
More broadly, previous research has considered the long-run effects of the Reformation on
the European economy through its influence on culture (Weber, 1904/05), education (Becker and
Woessmann, 2009), and politics (Rubin, 2017).11 Up to now, there has been little empirical work
documenting the Reformation’s economic consequences prior the 19th century.12 We shed light
on the path from the Reformation to long-run economic change, identifying the causal impact of
the Reformation on the emergence of a more secular society in Europe, and in Protestant Europe
in particular. The process of economic secularization that we document can be seen as having two
components: first, the strengthening of territorial lords—promoting institutional secularization—
and second, a reallocation of economic inputs toward secular purposes, specifically those favored
by territorial lords—reflecting allocational secularization.13 Both components played an important
9Relatedly, Heldring et al. (2017) argue that the Dissolution of the Monasteries during the English Reformation con-
tributed to long-run economic modernization by enriching and strengthening a particular segment of English society—
the gentry.
10To be clear, while we do not observe reallocation of resources toward private secular purposes, the introduction of
religious competition may have stimulated private sector economic activity along margins other than those we study.
11This literature is itself closely related to a larger literature on the economic consequences of religion and culture
(e.g., Barro and McCleary, 2003; McCleary and Barro, 2006; Guiso et al., 2006; Nunn, 2009; Kuran, 2011; Alesina and
Giuliano, 2015).
12This gap in the literature has been noted by Becker et al. (2016). Dittmar and Meisenzahl (2017) provide evidence
on both long- and short-run consequences of the Reformation operating through changes in city-level institutions that
varied across Protestant cities, highlighting within-Protestant differences, as opposed to territory-level differences in
religion we study here.
13Our findings on resource reallocation in response to a shock to the religious sector complement a large contempo-
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role in producing a modern, secular West (Durkheim, 1893; Mills, 1959; Saint-Simon, 1975) and
also—very early by global standards—produced conditions that have been linked by scholars to
modern economic growth (Weber, 1904/05; Kuran, 2011; Rubin, 2017).14
While we do not focus on the Reformation’s consequences for economic growth, our analysis
complements existing work in this area in two ways. First, conceptually, our findings point to po-
litical changes—consequences of the Reformation outside of the traditional macroeconomic pro-
duction function—as potentially important drivers of economic change in the long run. Consis-
tent with this view, Dittmar and Meisenzahl (2017) provide evidence that ideological and political
changes in a subset of Protestant cities resulted in the enactment of church ordinances establish-
ing the local government as a provider of public goods, with important consequences for human
capital and economic growth. Second, empirically, our work suggests that comparisons of geo-
graphically proximate Catholic and Protestant large cities may not fully capture Protestantism’s
long run economic impact. The Reformation had effects outside of Protestant regions, particularly
in Catholic regions bordering Protestant ones. The Reformation also had important effects in small
towns as well as large cities.15
Our findings also provide empirical evidence allowing us to contribute to classic debates in
social science. In perhaps the most famous social science work on the Reformation, Max Weber
argued that religious reform shaped economic behavior and thus contributed to the rise of capi-
talism.16 Subsequent research has tested for a causal effect of Protestantism on economic growth,
finding mixed results (Becker and Woessmann, 2009; Cantoni, 2015; Dittmar and Meisenzahl,
2017). Our evidence suggests a causal effect of the Reformation on economic activity—as sug-
gested by the stylized Weberian view—but along a very different margin, and working through a
different mechanism from that which is traditionally emphasized.
Tawney (1926) provides the classic response to Weber, emphasizing prior economic and insti-
rary literature on sectoral shocks and the allocation of economic inputs, particularly labor (e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger,
2001; Autor et al., 2016; Charles et al., 2016a,b).
14Surprisingly little evidence exists establishing a direct link from the Reformation to secularization, with many
scholars arguing for the importance of intermediate factors such as industrialization, social conflict, or nationalism
(e.g., McLeod, 1981; Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Martin, 2005; Becker and Woessmann, 2013; Becker et al., 2017).
15Cantoni (2015) points to small towns as locations where Protestant-Catholic differences in economic outcomes may
have been particularly pronounced.
16To be fair, this is a simplification of the “Weberian” argument. In the original, Weber’s focus is specifically on
Calvinism and does not exclude reverse causality, i.e. economic factors shaping religious change (Weber, 1904/05).
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tutional changes following Europe’s commercial revolution that drove the Reformation. First,
prior to the Reformation, European society was already characterized by important forms of
secularization—including the separation of secular and religious power that is central to the po-
litical market that we emphasize in our conceptual framework. Second, growing commerce and
economic change framed the religious critiques of the reformers themselves: Catholic Church
corruption was attacked precisely in the commodification and marketization of salvation, as ex-
emplified by Luther’s critique of the sale indulgences.
The rich data we assemble on the allocation of resources before and after the Reformation al-
low us to observe patterns of economic activity that might have foreshadowed the Reformation.
In data on human capital and fixed investments, we do not observe any trends towards secular-
ization prior to the Reformation. In occupational choice we do observe overall trends away from
church employment, though we do not observe any differential pre-trends towards seculariza-
tion in regions that would adopt Protestantism. This suggests that the post-Reformation resource
reallocation we observe was not previously in motion, and was not inevitable.
Yet, initial conditions were critical to the process that we document. Indeed, our conceptual
framework highlights the conflict between lords and the Catholic Church that plays an important
role in Tawney’s thinking about the underlying causes of the Reformation. We thus emphasize
that we identify a causal role for the Reformation on the allocation of resources, but we do not
rule out economic factors driving the Reformation.17
In what follows, we first, in Section II, present a historical overview of the Reformation viewed
through a framework linking religion to Europe’s political economy and the allocation of re-
sources. In Section III, we describe the datasets that we constructed to study the Reformation’s
economic consequences and document the reallocation of resources between the religious and sec-
ular sectors and across uses within the secular sector. In Section IV we offer concluding thoughts.
17Tawney’s (1926) analysis receives further support in our finding of unintended secularization produced by a reli-
gious movement; he writes that the Reformation’s political economy consequences were “without design, and against
the intention of most reformers” (Tawney, 1926, p. 88).
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II RELIGIOUS COMPETITION:
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
We model the Reformation as a competitive shock to the Catholic Church, which had been a mo-
nopolist producer of salvation for believers and the sole source of religiously-derived political
legitimacy for secular rulers in Western Europe for hundreds of years. In this section, we first
present our informal model of religious competition in Western Europe. We then discuss the
pre-Reformation equilibrium. Next, we describe the Reformation as a shock to competition and
discuss the post-Reformation equilibrium, providing historical evidence on the changed bargain
between secular and religious elites. Finally, we discuss the implications of the new equilibrium
for the allocation of resources in Europe, laying out the hypotheses that we test in our empirical
analysis below.
II.A Overview
Much prior work on the economics of religion has considered churches as producers and believers
as the consumers of salvation and perhaps other “club goods” (e.g. Ekelund et al., 2006). Believers
pay a price, comprising financial, time, and other costs. This approach to the analysis of religious
service provision provides a powerful lens through which to view religious monopoly and the
entry of a competitor. A monopolist church will charge a price above marginal cost, as would
any monopolist service provider, and a perfectly price-discriminating monopolist will extract all
of the surplus in the market. Entry by a competitor will reduce prices in the market for salvation,
leaving consumers better off.
To understand the economy-wide effects of the introduction of religious competition, we be-
lieve that a model must also incorporate a second market: one in which secular authorities pay a
price to churches in exchange for political legitimacy, in the form of the church’s endorsement of
a ruler. The price paid by the secular lord for the church’s endorsement is typically the lord’s own
endorsement and protection of the church’s theology, as well as some set of temporal concessions:
money, land, economic privileges, and political power. The bargains struck in this market for po-
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litical legitimacy have been critical to the organization of human societies for millennia, but have
been relatively understudied by economists (see Chaney, 2013, Belloc et al., 2016, and Rubin, 2017,
for important exceptions).
Entry of a competitor in a monopolistic religious environment will affect both markets. First,
the entrant will charge a lower price than the incumbent in the market for salvation. The incum-
bent will lower its price of salvation as well, but will be constrained in changing the price too
much: changes in price typically amount to a change in doctrine, which is extremely costly for a
religion’s legitimacy.18 Thus, the prices in the market for salvation will fall, particularly for be-
lievers purchasing salvation from the entrant. The market for legitimacy will in turn be affected
through three channels. The entrant will reduce the ability of the incumbent church to confer le-
gitimacy by questioning its theology. The attraction of believers to the entrant religion will also
reduce the value of legitimacy conferred by the incumbent. Finally, the ability to bargain with two
providers of religiously-derived political legitimacy will allow secular rulers to bargain down the
price paid to either entrant or incumbent. Thus, entry will unambiguously reduce the price paid
by secular lords to religious authorities.
Our model delivers predictions that are not a feature of existing models that emphasize the
market for salvation. By focusing on the political market, our model additionally predicts a shift
in the bargain between secular and church elites. This shift—the lower price in the market for
church-derived political legitimacy—could have first order economic consequences, as we discuss
below.
II.B Before the Reformation: the Catholic religious monopoly in Western Europe
At the start of the 16th century, just prior to the Reformation, the Catholic Church enjoyed a virtual
monopoly in the market for religion in Western Europe and extraordinary wealth and power (the
foundation stone of St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome was laid in 1506). The Church functioned as an
expensive intermediary between lay people and the divine, with services conducted in Latin and
substantial resources devoted to supporting specialist clerics (Cameron, 1991). It is unsurprising
18The incumbent religion may attract believers despite a higher price of salvation because it is costly to change
one’s faith. The incumbent might attract rulers despite a higher cost of legitimacy due both to reasons of faith and to
geopolitical strategic interests.
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that the Church was so rich: as a monopolist producer of salvation for believers and of religiously-
derived political legitimacy for rulers, it was able to extract enormous rents from the payment of
tithes and sacramental fees, as well as from its huge land holdings.19
However, the Church’s ability to extract rents was not unlimited. Its privileges and the mone-
tization of salvation through the sale of indulgences produced discontent among some believers,
thus threatening the Church’s authority—this would come to a head, of course, in Luther’s cir-
culation of his 95 theses in 1517. The Church was also constrained in its ability to extract rents
from secular lords, with whom there was continual conflict over the control of resources, jurisdic-
tion over territory, and the authority to appoint individuals to positions of power (e.g., bishops).20
Secular princes in Europe claimed their authority as derived directly from God, arguably making
them less reliant on religious endorsements for their political legitimacy than rulers in, for exam-
ple, the Islamic world. Rubin (2017) argues that this relatively limited reliance on religious elites
by secular authorities in Europe, relative to the Islamic World, played a crucial role in shaping
political economy in the two regions for centuries.
The pre-Reformation relationship between secular authorities and Church elites was one of
continual bargaining over power and resources. Bargaining reflected the political structure of the
Holy Roman Empire, which was an imperial federation of semi-autonomous principalities. At
the highest level was conflict between the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope over the “price” of
endorsement of secular rulers—in particular, the Holy Roman Emperor—by the Catholic Church.
During the 11th century “Investiture Controversy,” the Pope and Emperor contested the right
to appoint clerics to positions of immense power and wealth. Pope Gregory VII appeared to
have succeeded in extracting a higher price for Church endorsement when he excommunicated
Emperor Henry IV (withdrawing the Emperor’s legitimacy), leading Henry to beg Gregory for
reentry into communion, famously standing barefoot in the snow at Canossa in 1077. Yet, the
Church was far from being all powerful, and after further bargaining—often in the form of violent
19For example, the Catholic Church controlled approximately one-third of all farmland in the principality of
Wu¨rttemberg before the Reformation (Ocker, 2010, p. 56), and approximately 26 percent of farmland in the lordship of
Ruppin (Cohn, 1987, p. 172).
20Evidence of shared rents before the Reformation can be seen in the cooperation and agreements between secular
and church elites. For example, before the Reformation monasteries provided the majority of baggage carts used to
supply the armies of lords and were obliged to provide food and hospitality for lords and their entourages when lords
traveled through their domains. See Cohn (1987) for details.
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conflict—secular and Church authorities agreed to a compromise in the Concordat of Worms of
1122, which granted secular lords de facto power in the appointment of bishops, while respecting
the Church’s de jure right to invest bishops with their spiritual symbols of power.21 However,
conflict over resources continued: for example, just prior to the Reformation, the great defender of
the Catholic Church, Emperor Charles V, took control of Catholic Church assets—e.g. the domain
of the Bishop of Utrecht, as well as Arras and Cambrai (Ocker, 2010, p. 60).
Analogous conflicts characterized the relationships between religious elites and the territorial
lords we study in this research. Church institutions possessed numerous privileges (e.g., tax ex-
emptions and monopoly rights) and controlled huge swathes of land within the principalities of
the Holy Roman Empire. Secular lords were regularly engaged in attempts to claw back some
of the revenues lost: passing laws eliminating tax exemptions and imposing obligations on the
Church as landowner (Cohn, 1987, p. 162).
II.C The Reformation: the introduction of religious competition
Entry in the market for religion — In October 1517, Martin Luther circulated his famous 95 theses
critiquing Church practices.22 Luther’s critiques focused on the exorbitant price of salvation due
to corruption in the Catholic Church, and particularly the sale of “indulgences,” which believers
purchased to secure early release from purgatory. While Luther did not set out to challenge the
religious monopoly of the Catholic Church, a clear break between the Church and Luther emerged
in 1521, when the Edict of Worms condemned him as a heretic (see Table I for a summary of the
major events of the Reformation). Luther and his supporters responded by developing an agenda
for religious reform. Protestant reformers disseminated their ideas widely, rapidly, and relatively
cheaply using the newly invented printing press (Rubin, 2014; Dittmar and Seabold, 2016).
Protestant innovations attracted believers and princes by lowering prices in the markets for
salvation and for legitimacy. In the market for salvation, the key Protestant innovation was dis-
intermediation between the believer and God, which significantly lowered the cost, and price, of
21See Berman (1983) for a discussion of the consequences of this conflict and the reforms of Pope Gregory VII for the
development of legal institutions in Europe.
22The customary narrative tells of Luther posting his theses on the door of Wittenberg’s Castle Church on October
31, 1517. While this specific event is disputed by historians, the dissemination of Luther’s theses beginning in October
1517 is undisputed.
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salvation.23 Luther emphasized the importance of an individual believer’s relationship with God
and salvation by faith alone; he also reduced the number of sacraments from seven to two. These
innovations reduced the need for a priestly bureaucracy in Protestant regions. Cameron (1991,
p. 159) writes that, “For laypeople, the point about the Reformation was that it abolished the ex-
pensive and complicated apparatus to which they had resorted so regularly for the good of their
souls.”
Protestants also developed a critique of monasticism and argued that monastic control over
resources was unjustified. This message was popular with believers. A declaration from the 1520s
captures the popular spirit: “It is well known and clear to all that everywhere there are too many
monasteries, and that they unashamedly claim to be outside the world, and yet together with the
large foundations they even bring into their own possession all the goods of the world . . . we have
considered together and decided to tolerate no monastery any longer, but to close them” (quoted
in Cohn, 1979, p. 28).
The wealth held by monasteries represented the largest share of the Catholic Church’s income-
producing real estate (Ocker, 2010, p. 56) and was central to the Reformation-era bargain in the
market for religiously derived political legitimacy. Expropriation of monastery wealth was enor-
mously tempting to secular lords, but it required a legal and religious justification. Secular lords
attempted to extract from Protestant theologians religious and legal arguments for the seizure of
Catholic Church property; this was precisely an attempt to bargain down the price of religiously-
derived political legitimacy at the center of our conceptual framework.24
Secular rulers began expropriating monasteries in the 1520s and the Catholic Church responded
by filing claims for restitution at the Reichskammergericht—the highest court of the Holy Roman
Empire. Reflecting the “better bargain” secular rulers were offered by the religious entrant, Protes-
tant theologians provided detailed legal support for the reallocation of resources in memoranda.
23We emphasize differences between Catholic and Protestant theology. Lutheranism was the predominant form of
Protestantism in the territories we examine. However, it should be emphasized that Lutheran doctrine developed over
the period we study and that there were multiple currents within Lutheranism and Protestantism more broadly—e.g.
Zwinglianism and Calvinism also offered low cost salvation relative to Catholicism, but did not assign such centrality
to salvation by faith alone (Pettegree, 2004, p. 33). Similarly, while we emphasize the salience of material incentives,
religious choices were clearly also shaped by beliefs (Cohn, 1987).
24Note that some negotiation between lords and religious elites over lords’ rights to Church property also existed in
regions that remained Catholic.
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These memoranda justified the property rights claims of Protestant rulers with arguments, “con-
structed around meticulous citations of Canon and Roman law” (Ocker, 2010, p. 57). Thus,
Protestant theologians based their arguments on the body of ecclesiastical law developed by
Catholic jurists over previous centuries.25 Protestant theologians argued that secular lords who
adopted Protestantism and took control of church property were: (i) preventing misappropriation
by (Catholic) church agents and (ii) acting in a manner consistent with their legally recognized
role as lay administrators of church property (i.e., as church wardens or Kirchenvo¨gte).
A purge of Protestant jurists from the Reichskammergericht threatening secular lords’ claims to
formerly monastic wealth was followed by the formation of the Schmalkaldic League—a military
defense alliance—in 1530. A key objective of the Schmalkaldic League was to maintain secular
rulers’ control over former church property (Cohn, 1987).26
Given the legal and political uncertainty, some Protestant rulers proceeded with caution; the
Elector of Saxony only put confiscated properties under his own chancellery in the 1540s, follow-
ing the suspension of the Reichskammergericht (Ocker, 2010, p. 56, 60). The settlement after the
Schmalkaldic War (1545–6) effectively provided legal sanction to prior property transfers (Wha-
ley, 2011). Similar timing characterized the settlement of related property claims: for example,
Protestants also moved to expropriate the assets of some bishoprics, in “a lengthy process usually
only completed after 1555” (Ocker, 2010, p. 172). We study the implications of these evolving
changes in lords’ control of property for resource allocation, below.
It is important to note that Protestant theologians’ justification of the expropriation of Catholic
property did not by itself establish a “low price” of legitimacy for secular rulers. There remained
the question of how expropriated wealth could be used: would territorial lords be able to use
confiscated resources for themselves—indicating a true reallocation of resources from the religious
to the secular sphere? Or, would the allocation of resources simply shift from formerly Catholic
religious purposes to Protestant ones (including social welfare)? We next investigate the details
of the bargains struck between Protestant territorial lords and religious elites within this open-
25Ocker (2006, p. 13) describes these memoranda as “among the most overlooked works of the sixteenth century
reformers”.
26The importance of property rights to the League is apparent in negotiations between Protestant princes and the
(Catholic) emperor: the official 1540 position paper of the Schmalkaldic League addresses the question of property
rights first and religious doctrine second.
14
ended policy, presenting evidence on monastery closure and the reallocation of monastic resources
during the Reformation.
Monastery closure and the reallocation of resources — We first document patterns of closure,
gathering data on 3,094 monasteries described in Ju¨rgensmeier and Schwerdtfeger (2005–2008).
For each monastery, we collect data on its location, date of foundation, and date of closure, if
applicable.27 In Figure II, we present a map of the monasteries open in the German lands of the
Holy Roman Empire, highlighting those that closed in the 16th century.
Our analysis of monastery closure focuses on over 2,200 towns contained in the Deutsches
Sta¨dtebuch.28 For every town, we calculate the number of monasteries within 25 kilometers open
in each year. We exploit cross-sectional variation in territorial religion, assigning each town to its
secular lord following Nu¨ssli (2008) for 1500 (we refer to this as the “Euratlas” coding of territories)
and coding religion using Cantoni (2012).29
We present the pattern of monastery closure during the Reformation in Figure III. We plot
the average number of monasteries within 25 kilometers of towns that would become Protestant
and that would remain Catholic. Prior to 1517, the average number of monasteries proximate
to towns was quite steady. The number of monasteries near towns that would remain Catholic
was somewhat higher than near towns that would become Protestant, a fact that can be explained
by the location of Catholic cities—more likely to be in the “older,” southern and western parts
of the Empire. Importantly, however, trends are very similar in the two sets of towns prior to
27The data include both monasteries and convents, and we use the term “monasteries” as a short-hand. Closure
dates are directly coded from Ju¨rgensmeier and Schwerdtfeger (2005–2008). For over 67 percent of monasteries,
Ju¨rgensmeier and Schwerdtfeger (2005–2008) provide information on foundation dates. For the remaining monas-
teries, we first gather evidence on initial monastery construction by order and location from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch.
We identify the foundation dates of any residual monasteries from territorial archives. For example, for monasteries in
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg we review the databank “Klo¨ster in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg” maintained by the Landesarchiv Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg (the State Archive) at https://www.kloester-bw.de/index.php. We then cross-check against individual
monastery entries on www.wikipedia.de. In total, we identify foundation dates for 3,085 of 3,094 monasteries.
28We use “town” to describe the generic entry in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch, as the modal location was small. But it is
worth noting that the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch covers, and our data include, all incorporated units of Germany, including
large cities.
29Jurisdiction in early modern Germany involved fluid and overlapping claims among authorities. We thus view
the Euratlas region as a proxy for actual jurisdiction over the time period we study. Another complication is posed
by the existence of a small number of “free cities” that are not subject to a territorial lord. Most of these free cities are
dropped from our analysis, and our results are robust to excluding them entirely. A complete list of territories and their
(eventual) religion can be found in Online Appendix Table A1. Because not every city can be assigned a religion using
this mapping, as a robustness check, we directly code the religion of as many towns as possible using hand-collected
evidence from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch, and find very similar results.
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1517. Following the circulation of Luther’s 95 theses in 1517, the density of monasteries declined
across Germany, but with notable heterogeneity across religions. In towns whose territorial lords
adopted Protestantism, there was a sharp decline in the number of monasteries during the Ref-
ormation: a reduction of over two-thirds by 1600. In towns whose lords remained Catholic, the
decline was significantly smaller.
The fundamental question we next address is whether the closure of monasteries produced
inter-sectoral reallocation of resources or intra-sectoral reallocation. The allocation of formerly
Catholic resources would be determined by the bargain between secular and church elites. The
“price” Protestant theologians initially offered to secular rulers was high: formerly Catholic re-
sources were to be devoted to religious uses. Ocker (2010, pp. 54–55) writes that Protestant clergy
proposed using confiscated monastic wealth to support Protestant pastors and to establish a “com-
mon chest” for social welfare; he continues, “theologians only granted rulers a free hand in church
property when property remained after the needs of schools, poor relief, and public welfare had
been met.” Historical evidence suggests that some formerly Catholic resources were, indeed, used
for church and social welfare purposes. In the Electorate of Saxony (Luther’s home), monastic
resources were transferred to a common chest that provided support for orphans and the poor.
Incomes were also used to support former monks. For example, in Wu¨rttemberg monks were
offered annual pensions of 25 guilders, equivalent to 254 days of skilled wages (Wolgast, 2014,
p. 110).30
Over time, however, the price fell, and Protestant theologians conceded a greater share of re-
sources to lords. While the theologians advising the Schmalkaldic League drafted an agreement
assigning confiscated lands to Protestant church uses, this agreement was rejected by the rulers of
Pomerania and Wu¨rttemberg and never adopted by the League (Wolgast, 2014, p. 130).31 Histori-
cal evidence indicates that large-scale transfers of wealth to secular rulers became the norm; Wol-
gast (2014) provides numerous descriptions of secular lords seizing church property and enriching
themselves, of which we highlight several here. In Hesse, Landgrave Philipp received annual rev-
30Guilders here and below (traditionally abbreviated as “fl.”) are converted to person-year equivalents using average
wage data for skilled labor in Munich, Augsburg, and Leipzig, taken from Allen (2012).
31The incumbent Catholic Church also made concessions over the control of resources to secular lords in territories
that remained Catholic.
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enues of 16,500 guilders in 1532 from monastery lands and 25,000 guilders in 1565, equivalent to
one-seventh of total state revenues and around 1,000 person-years of skilled wages. Overall, 40
percent of monastic wealth in Hesse went to the ruler—not to religious, educational, or social wel-
fare purposes. In East Frisia, Count Enno II converted the monastery in Norden into a summer
residence for himself and converted the monastery at Ihlow into a residence for his brother. In
Wu¨rttemberg, Duke Ulrich extracted 40,000 guilders’ income from monastery lands. In Branden-
burg, monasteries were allowed to keep their privileges following the adoption of Protestantism
in exchange for a payment of 300,000 guilders. Protestant theologians provided legal justifications
for these property transfers and thus served as “the technicians of religious legitimacy” (Ocker,
2006, p. 13).
In Table II, we summarize the historical evidence on church property expropriation by secular
lords in the Protestant regions we study. We find evidence of significant enrichment of territorial
lords in 16 of 18 territories, indicating a shift in the bargain between secular and religious author-
ities and inter-sectoral resource allocation: lands and riches that once belonged to the Catholic
Church were conceded by Protestant religious elites to secular lords’ control.
The shift of bargaining power from religious to secular elites transferred not only resources
toward secular lords, but also political power.32 Cohn (1987, p. 176) writes that “The acquisition
of church property and the strengthened administration which it encouraged were bound up with
many less tangible advantages gained by the means of the Reformation. Functions that had once
been dispersed among several authorities became concentrated in the state. Officialdom pene-
trated more pervasively than before in towns, villages and families. Ecclesiastical jurisdiction was
swept away.”
II.D Implications of religious competition for the broader economy
During the Reformation, secular lords paid significantly less to church elites for the provision of
legitimacy, especially in Protestant territories. Secular authorities retained greater political power,
acquired new land, and gained control of wealth expropriated from the Catholic Church. Many
32By closing monasteries, rather than re-orienting monastic energy toward new activities, secular lords ensured that
the shift in political power was difficult to reverse.
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of the resources acquired from the Catholic Church were not reallocated toward Protestant church
purposes, but were retained by secular lords, as shown above. The change in the market for
church-derived political legitimacy suggests the following hypotheses regarding resource reallo-
cation during the Reformation.
The allocation of human capital — Enriched and empowered lords across Germany, and par-
ticularly in Protestant regions, demanded more labor for their own aggrandizement and for the
administration of their territory. An ordinance from Wu¨rttemberg from 1546 notes that “Men
[we]re needed to serve in preaching offices, governments, temporal posts, [and] administrative
offices” (Strauss, 1988). In addition, in Protestant regions, the church sector demanded signif-
icantly less labor owing to the lower cost salvation production function in Protestant theology.
This freed labor for uses other than salvation. There was a supply-side effect of the Reformation
as well: Ocker (2010, p. 62) writes, “The new faith rebutted the most compelling reason to become
a monk or a nun—to save one’s soul and the souls of others. This rebuttal coincided with, and
surely abetted, widespread attrition in monasteries.”
Hypotheses: We expect a shift in occupations from the church sector to the secular sector dur-
ing the Reformation, particularly in regions that became Protestant. We also expect a shift to-
ward occupations supporting the aims of secular lords—for example, administrative and military
positions—following the Reformation, particularly in regions that became Protestant.
Human capital investments — Forward looking students should have perceived the sectoral
shift in labor demand and adjusted their human capital investments accordingly, away from
church-sector specific theology study, and toward studies in more general fields.33
Hypotheses: We expect a shift in degrees granted from theology toward secular subjects (arts,
law and medicine) during the Reformation, particularly in universities that became Protestant.
The empowering of secular lords suggests a shift specifically toward degrees that led to jobs in
public administration—law and the arts—during the Reformation, particularly in regions that
became Protestant.
33Reflecting their increased demand for skilled labor, secular princes provided support for investments in university
education. It is important to note, however, that university degrees initially fell following 1517 before increasing again
with the institutionalization of the Reformation and formal support provided by princes (Seifert, 1996). This can be
seen in our own data presented in Online Appendix Figure A1, Panels B and C.
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Fixed capital investments — The increase in power and resources controlled by secular lords
during the Reformation, particularly in Protestant regions, should also have been reflected in fixed
investments. Construction activity—reflecting the allocation of land and physical, financial, and
human capital—can be seen as a summary statistic that characterizes the allocation of resources
in early modern Europe. In our context, empowered and enriched secular rulers used their new
wealth to construct palaces that provided consumption value and signaled their power, and built
new administrative buildings from which their expanded authority was projected.
Hypotheses: We expect new construction activity to shift toward secular purposes during the
Reformation, particularly in Protestant regions. And, reflecting the enhanced powers of secular
lords, one would expect that the shift in construction to reflect the aims and desires of secular
lords, e.g., the construction of palaces, military, and administrative structures. The historical evi-
dence also suggests that secular construction should have increased with some lag, reflecting the
insecurity of secular lords’ property rights claims to newly appropriated assets prior to the mid-
16th century. Finally, prior research (Ekelund et al., 2006) suggests that the heightened intensity of
religious competition in Catholic border regions could lead resource allocation in these regions to
resemble those in Protestant territories. We thus expect that the most pronounced differences in
construction between Protestant and Catholic regions should be found between Protestant regions
and Catholic regions away from borders.
We test these each of these hypotheses in our empirical work below.
III THE REALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
III.A Data sources
Our analysis is focused on two sets of data: (i) German university graduates’ degrees and careers,
which provide evidence on the consequences of the Reformation for the allocation of skilled labor
and investments in human capital; and, (ii) construction activity across Germany over time, pro-
viding evidence on the allocation of land, labor, and capital in fixed investments. In this section,
we describe the sources from which these data are drawn, in turn. We also discuss our assignment
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of towns, territories, and universities to religious denominations.
University graduates: degrees and careers — Our main source of information on German univer-
sity graduates is the Repertorium Academicum Germanicum (Schwinges and Hesse, 2015), a research
program (and online database) developed by historians at the Universities of Berne and Giessen,
collecting individual-level information on the universe of recipients of academic degrees from
German universities through the year 1550. The German universities are: Basel, Erfurt, Frank-
furt an der Oder, Freiburg, Greifswald, Heidelberg, Ingolstadt, Ko¨ln, Leipzig, Mainz, Marburg,
Rostock, Trier, Tu¨bingen, Wittenberg, and Wu¨rzburg.34
Schwinges and Hesse (2015), which we refer to as “RAG” henceforth, collect information on
each degree recipient’s degree subject(s) and year(s) from university registry sources. The degrees
granted include bachelor’s degrees, licenses, master’s degrees, and doctorate degrees. To mea-
sure post-1550 human capital investments, in particular after the Schmalkaldic War (1546) and
the Peace of Augsburg (1555), we hand collect data on university degrees granted by the German
universities included in the RAG dataset between 1540 and 1600, consulting Bauch (1897); Erler
(1895, 1897, 1909); Eulenburg (1904); Kleineidam (1983); Leinweber (1991); Ru¨egg (1996); Stein-
meyer (1912).35 We thus have two datasets on university degrees: one covering the years through
1600 at the university×year level, and one covering the years through 1550 at the individual level.
In our empirical analysis below, we will present results based on both datasets.
Degrees were granted by one of the four traditional faculties that universities of the time fea-
tured: arts, law, medicine, and theology. We classify degrees in arts, law, and medicine as “secu-
lar” to distinguish them from more church sector-specific training in theology. We will also focus
more narrowly on arts and law degrees, which were more likely to lead to careers in the service of
territorial lords. Evidence on career paths associated with degrees in different fields is provided
34Note that we do not consider in our analysis universities attended by Germans outside of the borders of modern
Germany, such as Louvain or Prague; nor do we include several small universities opened after 1550, such as Jena.
Basel joined the Swiss Confederation only during the period of our study.
35Online Appendix Figure A1 presents the overall pattern of degrees in the RAG data and in our own data collection.
It is important to note that data on degrees granted by one of the largest Catholic universities, Cologne, are not available
after 1550, which is reflected in the lower counts of degrees granted after 1550 in our complete dataset (Panel A). One
can see the pattern of degrees granted by universities other than Cologne in Panel B, and the pattern of degrees granted
by eventually Protestant universities in Panel C. Importantly, when we examine shares of degrees granted in theology
or secular subjects, the inclusion or exclusion of Cologne has no impact on our results (as we discuss below). The
numbers of degrees granted by level and by individual subject can be seen in Table A2 in the Online Appendix.
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in Section III.C, below.
In addition to information on degrees received, the RAG database contains information on ca-
reers for around one fourth of students receiving degrees between 1480 and 1550. Unfortunately,
we are unable to extend the coverage to individuals receiving degrees after 1550, so we rely on a
single careers dataset at the individual level, covering the years through 1550. The RAG provides
over 400 different occupational titles in its database. For example, the top five occupations in terms
of frequency are: Professor, Kanoniker (Canon), Domherr (Canon, typically receiving a stipend),
Dekan (Deacon), and Kleriker (Priest). Other occupations include judges, bakers, guild masters,
mayors, city councillors, teachers, headmasters, and goldsmiths. Many of the occupation titles are
archaic; we thus rely on the Thesaurus Professionum Forschungsstelle fu¨r Personalschriften (Marburg,
2015), which categorizes historic occupations into seven one-digit categories with subcategories.
In our empirical analysis, we divide the occupations into two broad categories: “church” (in-
cluding priests, monks, etc.) and “secular” (including professors, judges, mayors, etc.). We also
examine the specific subset of secular occupations that were administrative.
Below, we study the heterogeneous effects of the Reformation on degrees received and occupa-
tions selected into depending on the religious denomination of the university at which an individ-
ual studied. We rely on Sehling (1902-2013), Spitz (1981), Grendler (2004), Naragon (2006) to iden-
tify the universities that adopted Protestantism: Basel, Erfurt, Frankfurt an der Oder, Greifswald,
Heidelberg, Leipzig, Marburg, Rostock, Tu¨bingen, and Wittenberg. The adoption of Protestantism
occurred in a wave between 1520 and 1550, and the choice was nearly always permanent.36
Construction events — We hand-code several thousand unique, major construction “events” at
the town level, described in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch. Each town’s entry in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch
includes a section (section 5) titled, “Die Stadt als Siedlung” (“The City as Settlement”) within
which exists a subcategory (5b) titled, “Markante Gebaude” (“Notable/Important Construction”).
We code each construction event by location, start date, and sector.37 We assign the finely
36Note that one university, the University of Erfurt, became Lutheran in 1521 and returned to Catholicism in 1530s.
We thus treat Erfurt as a Catholic university. In Online Appendix Figure A2 we show the time series of the number of
German universities as well as the number that adopted Protestantism.
37Not all construction events are associated with a precise year. For the purposes of our research here, we limit the
analysis to those construction events with clearly-specified first years (i.e., “construction starts”). Note, too, that any
potential differences in the original collection of data across volumes of the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch will be accounted for
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detailed construction events to “church construction” (e.g., churches or monasteries) and “secu-
lar construction” (e.g., town halls, bridges, malls, palaces, or schools) and examine these broad
categories in much of our analysis.38 We also specifically study secular administrative buildings
and palace construction as indicators of fixed investments for purposes favored by secular lords.
Construction events are linked to Protestant or Catholic regions based on the town of the event:
as we did in the analysis of monastery closure, we assign towns to territorial lords following the
“Euratlas” mapping provided by Nu¨ssli (2008) and use information on the religion of territorial
lords from Cantoni (2012).
III.B Occupational choice
We begin our analysis of the allocation of highly-skilled labor by examining the occupational
choices of university graduates. Our conceptual framework and historical evidence above sug-
gested that the Reformation should have immediately reduced the demand for skilled labor in
the religious sector and increased the demand for skilled labor for secular purposes, with effects
being concentrated in Protestant territories. We compare the rates at which university graduates
took jobs in the church sector and the secular sector across time and depending on the religious
denomination of the university from which they graduated.
In Figure IV, we present the shares of first jobs by sector—church and secular—by year, sep-
arately for graduates of universities that would adopt Protestantism and for those that would
remain Catholic. One can see that in both types of universities, shares of jobs in the church and
secular sectors converged on an even 50-50 split at the time of the Reformation. While there is an
overall trend toward secular occupations observed prior to the Reformation in both universities
that would adopt Protestantism and those that would remain Catholic, it is important to note that
there is not a differential pre-Reformation trend depending on eventual religious denomination.
After the Reformation, the patterns of occupational sorting look distinctly different across uni-
in panel regressions with fixed effects.
38As noted above, we make a sharp distinction between the “church” or religious sector and the secular sector, when
in practice there was certainly a grey area between the two. We do believe that our coding is generally accurate; for
example, schools served both religious and secular purposes, but as Strauss (1988, p. 193) notes, post-Reformation
compulsory schooling laws “placed the supervision of all educational institutions firmly in the hands of princes and
magistrates, who were the owners and wielders of the instruments of public power.”
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versity denominations, with a break in trend toward first jobs in the secular sector among gradu-
ates of Protestant universities, and a smooth continuation of the pre-existing trend toward secular
first jobs among graduates of Catholic universities. Thus, we see in the raw data a shift toward
secular sector first jobs after the Reformation, specifically among graduates of Protestant univer-
sities, as predicted. It is important to emphasize that Figure IV reveals a post-1517 reduction in
religious employment overall, not only a decline in monastic jobs, which mechanically resulted
from monastery closure, and which could have been offset by increases in other religious occupa-
tions.
We next more formally test for differences in the likelihood that university graduates would
take first jobs in the church sector (rather than the secular sector), comparing graduates from
universities that remained Catholic and graduates from universities that adopted Protestantism,
decade by decade. Specifically, we estimate the following flexible difference in differences model:
churchiut = αu + δt +
1540
∑
τ=1480
βτ(protu × decadeτ) + ǫiut, (1)
where churchiut is an indicator capturing whether student i graduating from university u in decade
t took a first occupation in the church sector.39 The αu terms are a full set of university fixed effects;
δt are a full set of decade fixed effects, and the explanatory variables of interest are the interactions
between decade fixed effects and an “eventually Protestant university” dummy variable (the omit-
ted reference decade is 1510–1519, just prior to the Reformation).40
We estimate standard errors allowing for clustering at the university×decade level.
In addition to the more flexible decade-by-decade model, we estimate a more aggregated
difference-in-differences model with three time periods: first, the three decades from 1480–1509;
next, the omitted reference decade from 1510–1519; finally, the three decades following the omitted
decade, from 1520–1549. In this specification, the interaction between the “eventually Protestant
university” dummy variable and the 1480–1519 time period dummy allows for a formal test of
differential pre-Reformation trends between graduates of universities that would become Protes-
39The subscript t indicates the first year of the decade from 1480 through 1540, inclusive.
40Our empirical analysis treats the Reformation era coarsely, and does not rely on variation in a university’s or
territory’s date of adoption of Protestantism. We consider the precise timing of a territory’s adoption of Protestantism
in three case studies presented in Section III.D.
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tant and those that would remain Catholic. The interaction between the “eventually Protestant
university” dummy variable and the post-Reformation (1520–1549) dummy variable allows us to
identify the differential shift in occupations among graduates from Protestant universities in the
Reformation era. That model is as follows:
churchiut = αu + δt +
3
∑
τ=1
βτ(protu × periodτ) + ǫiut, (2)
where the only change relative to equation 1 is that instead of seven decade dummies interacted
with the “eventually Protestant university” dummy variable, we now have three time periods
(1480–1509, 1510–1519, and 1520–1549).
Figure V, panel A, presents all of our estimates from equations 1 and 2 graphically. We plot dots
indicating the decade-by-decade “eventually Protestant university” interaction estimates (and
bars indicating their 90% confidence intervals). These estimates show the difference between
Protestant and Catholic university graduates’ likelihood of having a first job in the church sec-
tor in a particular decade, relative to the difference in 1510–1519. One can see that prior to 1510,
the difference in first jobs between Protestant and Catholic university graduates was small, and
was not strongly trending. Then, beginning in 1520, Protestant university graduates became sig-
nificantly less likely than Catholic university graduates to have first jobs in the church sector. Each
Protestant×decade interaction is negative from 1520, and two of the three are statistically signifi-
cantly less than zero.
Figure V, panel A, also shows the estimated coefficients on the interactions between the more
aggregated time period dummy variables and the “eventually Protestant university” dummy from
estimating the pooled specification. The point estimates are drawn in as horizontal lines, and
their 90% confidence intervals are depicted as boxes. One can see in the figure that the prior to
the Reformation there were small, statistically insignificant differences in occupational sectors be-
tween graduates of universities that would eventually be Protestant and those that would remain
Catholic. There was no differential pre-Reformation trend. One also can see a statistically signifi-
cant fall in the likelihood of Protestant university graduates having a first job in the church sector
during the Reformation era of around 11.8 percentage points. This represents a large decline rela-
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tive to the pre-Reformation mean of around 57% of students taking a job in the church sector, and
supports the prediction of our conceptual framework.
While we document an unambiguous reallocation of upper tail human capital across sectors,
an important question about the patterns seen in Figure V is whether the decline in church-
sector employment among university graduates was offset by increases in the employment of
non-university graduates in the religious sector in Protestant territories.41 However, abundant
historical evidence indicates that religious sector employment sharply declined across the board
in Protestant regions. For example, McLaughlin (2003, p. 70) observes:
The Protestant preachers in German cities represented only a small fraction of the num-
ber of Catholic priests found there during the later Middle Ages. . . . The abolition of
religious orders and the suppression of non-parochial shrines and pilgrimage churches
released their attendant clergy. The elimination of minor orders—subdeacons, acolytes,
exorcists, doorkeeper—contributed to the decline, as did the dismantling of the higher
ranks of bishop and archbishop. The numerous clergy who had staffed episcopal
courts and offices disappeared as well. In fact, the enormous bureaucratic structure,
developed in the Catholic Church during its long history, simply disappeared.
In addition to changes in the sector of employment, a second prediction arising from our con-
ceptual framework is that within the secular sector, university graduates should specifically have
sorted into secular occupations in the service of territorial lords in the Reformation era, partic-
ularly in Protestant regions. We use administrative occupations as a proxy for occupations in
the service of secular lords. For illustration, the five most common administrative occupations
in our data are procurator (Prokurator), notary (Notar), city councillor (Ratsherr), councillor (Rat),
and public notary (O¨ffentlicher Notar).42 To test whether there was a differential shift toward ad-
ministrative occupations among graduates of Protestant universities during the Reformation, we
41It is important to note, however, that educational standards for Protestant clergy were relatively high—if anything
higher than for Catholic clergy. Still, only a minority of priests had obtained a degree from a university. The requirement
that simple priests would have to attend or obtain a degree from a university was enforced only later, in the 17th century
(Kaufmann, 2003, pp. 125–30).
42Note that because education and health occupations (e.g., professors and doctors) were less clearly linked to the
service of territorial lords, we do not include them in our proxy. We do include the very small number of military
occupations in our classification of careers in the service of territorial lords (this is inconsequential for our findings).
For concision, we use the label “administrative” for the slightly broader set of occupations.
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estimate regressions analogous to those presented in Figure V, panel A, but now considering as
the outcome variable a dummy indicating that an individual’s career was administrative. That is,
we estimate equations 1 and 2, but substitute adminiut for churchiut.
One can see in Figure V, panel B, suggestive evidence consistent with our conceptual frame-
work’s prediction. While there was essentially no difference in the probability of (eventually)
Protestant or Catholic university graduates taking administrative jobs before the Reformation, a
gap emerged in the first decades of the Reformation.43 This gap should be interpreted cautiously,
as only one of the three decade interactions is significantly different from zero, and over the en-
tire Reformation era, we find a marginally statistically insignificant effect (p = 0.126). Still, the
estimated 5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of Protestant university graduates sorting
into administrative positions is economically large relative to the baseline rate of administrative
employment: prior to the Reformation, only around 10% of students took jobs in administration.
III.C Investments in church-specific versus more general human capital
An implication of the reduced employment prospects in the church sector is that forward-looking
students should invest less in human capital that specifically has a high payoff in the church sector.
In addition, increased demand for labor by secular lords should lead students to invest in human
capital that is associated with administrative career paths.
While highly-skilled individuals entered church employment from a range of educational
backgrounds, there was a particular human capital investment that was essentially church specific:
the study of theology. As can be seen in Table III, while 54% of students in the RAG database with-
out a theology degree had some church sector employment in their careers, this number jumps to
90% among individuals with a theology degree (the difference in proportions is highly statisti-
cally significant).44 Thus, one would expect a shift away from the study of theology in Protestant
regions during the Reformation.
There was no human capital investment that was specific to careers in administration; how-
43Kim and Pfaff (2012) show that Protestant university graduates also affected the political economy of Germany by
shaping the spread of the Reformation itself; this would have tended to reinforce the processes we document.
44Note that we include in Table III university students with a first job that was not readily classified by sector and
hence are not included in our regression analysis of first job outcomes. Restricting our analysis of associations between
degrees and career paths to individuals included in our regression analysis does not affect our findings.
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ever, one can see in Table III that individuals with degrees in law or the arts were more more than
twice as likely to take administration jobs than individuals without these degrees (e.g., individuals
who only studied theology or medicine—note that some individuals would have studied in mul-
tiple fields). One might therefore also expect a shift toward the study of arts and law in Protestant
regions during the Reformation.
We thus examine whether there was not only a shift in the occupations of the highly skilled
during the Reformation, but also a shift in the type of human capital they acquired. We begin, in
Figure VI, by presenting the shares of students investing in church-specific human capital (study-
ing theology) and in more general, secular human capital over time, by the denomination of the
university attended. One can see in the figure that, indeed, following the Reformation, partic-
ularly among students at Protestant universities, there was a striking shift away from the study
of theology. Prior to the Reformation, around 10% of degrees were awarded in theology, and, if
anything, universities that would become Protestant granted a slightly higher share of theology
degrees than universities that would remain Catholic. After the Reformation, the share of theol-
ogy degrees granted fell below 2% in Protestant universities; in Catholic universities, the share of
theology degrees granted fell in the middle of the 16th century, but by 1600 the share had returned
to the level observed prior to the Reformation.45
We next formally test for the statistical significance of this divergence in human capital invest-
ments, estimating models analogous to those from our analysis of university graduates’ careers,
but now considering as our outcome the subject of an individual’s degree. Specifically, we esti-
mate:
theologyiut = αu + δt +
1540
∑
τ=1480
βτ(protu × decadeτ) + ǫiut, (3)
where theologyiut is an indicator capturing whether student i graduating from university u in
decade t earned a theology degree. As in equation 1, the αu terms are a full set of university
45The increase in theology degrees in Catholic regions coincides with the Counter-Reformation. Note that these
patterns appear within degree types as well: both examining only bachelor’s degrees, or examining only advanced
degrees. The patterns observed are also very similar if we exclude Cologne from the entire period of analysis. Finally,
it is worth noting that degree counts in secular subjects increased markedly in universities that became Protestant (see
Online Appendix Figure A1, Panel C).
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fixed effects; δt are a full set of decade fixed effects, and the explanatory variables of interest are
the interactions between decade fixed effects and an “eventually Protestant university” dummy
variable (and the omitted reference decade is 1510–1519, just prior to the Reformation). As was
done above, standard errors will be estimated allowing for clustering at the university×decade
level.
In addition to the more flexible decade-by-decade estimates, we again estimate a more aggre-
gated difference-in-differences model with three time periods, analogous to equation 2. Specifi-
cally, we estimate:
theologyiut = αu + δt +
3
∑
τ=1
βτ(protu × periodτ) + ǫiut, (4)
where the only change relative to equation 3 is that instead of seven decade dummies interacted
with the “eventually Protestant university” dummy variable, we now have three time periods:
(1480–1509, 1510–1519, and 1520–1549). As was the case in the analysis of careers, the interaction
between the “eventually Protestant university” dummy variable and the 1480–1519 time period
dummy allows for a formal test of pre-Reformation trends. The interaction between the “eventu-
ally Protestant university” dummy variable and the post-Reformation (1520–1549) dummy vari-
able allows us to identify the differential shift in degrees among graduates from Protestant uni-
versities in the Reformation era.
Figure VII panel A, presents all of our estimates from equations 3 and 4 graphically, in a man-
ner analogous to our analysis of careers. One can see in the figure that during the Reformation,
there was an economically and statistically significant decline in the likelihood of Protestant uni-
versity graduates receiving a degree in theology. The coefficient on the more aggregated post-
Reformation interaction shows around a 4.5 percentage point decline in theology degrees—large
relative to the pre-Reformation mean share of theology degrees of around 6%—and statistically
significant at the 5% level as well. Prior to the Reformation there was no significant difference
between graduates of Catholic and (eventually) Protestant universities in the likelihood of an in-
dividual receiving a theology degree: individual decade-level interactions are insignificantly dif-
ferent from zero, and the coefficient on the more aggregated pre-Reformation interaction is tiny.
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There is, admittedly, some evidence of a differential decline in the likelihood of theology study in
(eventually) Protestant universities from 1480–1509, but this was reversed in the last decade be-
fore the Reformation, suggesting that pre-Reformation trends do not drive the post-Reformation
patterns we observe.
We next test whether there was a differential shift toward degrees that were more likely to lead
to administrative occupations among graduates of Protestant universities during the Reformation.
To do so, we estimate regressions analogous to those presented in Figure VII, panel A, but now
considering as the outcome variable a dummy indicating that an individual’s degree was in law
or the arts. That is, we estimate equations 3 and 4, but substitute law or artsiut for theologyiut. One
can see in Figure VII, panel B, evidence consistent with our prediction. While there was essentially
no difference in the probability of (eventually) Protestant or Catholic university graduates earn-
ing degrees in law or the arts before the Reformation (and no differential trend), a gap emerged
between Protestant and Catholic university graduates’ degrees in the first decades of the Refor-
mation. The coefficient on the more aggregated post-Reformation interaction shows around a 2
percentage point increase in the likelihood of a Protestant university graduate earning a degree in
law or the arts after 1520 (marginally statistically significant, with p = 0.09).
III.D Construction activity
We view construction activity as approximating a summary statistic for the allocation of economic
resources due to the requirements of land and financial, human, and physical capital.46 Our highly
disaggregated data on construction activity allow us to test a rich set of hypotheses that arise from
our conceptual framework.
Construction activity across territories around the time of the Reformation — Our conceptual
framework and historical evidence lead us to expect a shift in resources—and thus construction
activity—toward secular purposes during the Reformation, particularly toward uses favored by
secular lords, and in territories that adopted Protestantism. Because lords’ expropriation of church
46Note that the physical capital embodied in monasteries was typically not destroyed during the (largely peaceful)
process of closure and expropriation. Thus, new construction events are not simply restoring previously existing, but
destroyed, real property.
resources was not consolidated in the initial decades of the Reformation, we expect reallocation
reflected in construction starts to be particularly pronounced beginning in the 1550s. We also
expect to observe differences between Protestant and Catholic territories reflecting variation in
the intensity of religious competition in Catholic areas—which prior research suggests was more
intense in the border regions of Catholic territories (Ekelund et al., 2006).
We begin our analysis of construction activity across church and secular sectors by showing,
in Figure VIII, new construction events per town per year by sector (church and secular are ex-
haustive and mutually exclusive categories of construction). We show the time series of construc-
tion separately for towns whose territorial lords eventually adopted Protestantism and for towns
whose lords remained Catholic. Note that the likelihood of a major construction event is small for
a given town×year observation: on average, German towns had one to two major construction
events per century in the early-modern era.
Several clear facts emerge from Figure VIII. First, in both territories adopting Protestantism
and those that remained Catholic, church-sector construction predominated prior to the Reforma-
tion. Second, in both “eventually Protestant” and “always Catholic” towns, secular construction
increased and church construction decreased just after Luther circulated his 95 theses in 1517.
Third, the shift in resources was much greater and more sustained in regions that adopted Protes-
tantism: by the end of the 16th century, rates of new secular construction were nearly double rates
of new church construction in Protestant towns. In Catholic towns, in contrast, church and secular
construction were roughly equal at the end of the 16th century.
We next more formally examine the Reformation-era differences in construction between Catholic
and Protestant regions using a regression framework. We aggregate our construction event data to
territory×decade-level units in order to more precisely estimate differences in a context in which
the vast majority of towns have zero construction events in a given year. In addition, we examine
counts of construction events by sector (rather than a sector’s share of events) due to the presence
of cells with zero total construction.
We estimate the following “flexible” difference in differences model separately for the church
sector and the secular sector:
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constructionjt = αj + δt +
1590
∑
τ=1480
βτ(protj × decadeτ) + ǫjt, (5)
where constructionjt is a count of the construction events in territory j, in decade t; αj is a set of
territory fixed effects; δt is a set of decade fixed effects; and the explanatory variables of interest are
the interactions between an “eventually Protestant territory” dummy variable and decade fixed
effects (with 1510–1519 the omitted reference decade). Standard errors are estimated allowing for
clustering at the territory level.
In addition, we estimate models with four more aggregate time periods that we interact with
the “eventually Protestant territory” dummy. First, the three decades from 1480–1509; next, the
omitted reference decade from 1510–1519; third, the three decades of political instability follow-
ing the omitted decade, from 1520–1549; finally, the post-Schmalkaldic War era decades from
1550–1599. In this specification, the interaction between the “eventually Protestant territory”
dummy variable and the 1480–1519 time period dummy allows for a formal test of differential
pre-Reformation trends in construction activity between territories that would become Protestant
and those that would remain Catholic. The interaction between the “eventually Protestant terri-
tory” dummy variable and the first post-Reformation (1520–1549) dummy allows us to identify
the differential shift in construction in Protestant territories in the early Reformation era. And,
the interaction with the second post-Reformation (1550–1599) dummy variable allows us to iden-
tify the differential shift in construction in Protestant territories after territorial lords’ seizures of
church property were consolidated and after political stability was established. This more aggre-
gated difference in differences model, again estimated separately for construction in the church
and in the secular sector, is as follows:
constructionjt = αj + δt +
4
∑
τ=1
βτ(protj × periodτ) + ǫjt, (6)
where the only change relative to equation 5 is that instead of twelve decade dummies inter-
acted with the “eventually Protestant territory” dummy variable, we now have four time periods:
(1480–1509, 1510–1519, 1520–1549, and 1550–1599).
In the left-hand frame of Figure IX, panel A, we present all of our estimates from equations 5
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and 6 for the church sector. One can see in the decade-level interaction estimates that prior to
the Reformation, (eventually) Protestant territories saw somewhat fewer church sector construc-
tion events than (remaining) Catholic territories. The gap between them was closing in the early
16th century, then opens widely in the Reformation era, with Protestant territories experiencing
statistically significantly less church sector construction than Catholic territories.
When we examine the more aggregate interactions, these patterns are reinforced: prior to 1510,
there was less church sector construction in territories that would adopt Protestantism, but not
significantly so, and if anything the trend was toward eliminating the difference just before the
Reformation. Then, after the Reformation, both before and after the Schmalkaldic War, there was
statistically significantly less church sector construction in Protestant than Catholic regions.
Next, in the left-hand frame of Figure IX, panel B, we present all of our estimates from equa-
tions 5 and 6 for the secular sector. This is nearly an inverted image of panel A (note that this is
not mechanical, as we do not study construction shares). The decade-level interaction estimates
show that prior to the Reformation, (eventually) Protestant territories saw somewhat more secu-
lar sector construction events than (remaining) Catholic territories; this difference was statistically
significant for the decades from 1490–1509, indicating a move toward less secular construction in
(eventually) Protestant territories just prior to the Reformation, in the 1510–1519 decade. One can
see that in the Reformation era, there is again greater secular sector construction in Protestant ter-
ritories than in Catholic ones, and that this gap is particularly pronounced in the decades after the
Schmalkaldic War (1550–1599).
Examining the aggregated interactions, one first sees a statistically significant pre-1510 inter-
action. It is worth discussing this in some detail: first, this result does not imply that the post-1520
patterns we observe were merely the continuation of a pre-Reformation trend. Just the opposite:
just prior to the Reformation—moving from the 1480–1509 interaction to the omitted 1510–1519
decade—shows a negative pre-Reformation trend in secular construction in (eventually) Protestant
territories relative to Catholic ones. Rather, the major concern raised by the significant pre-1510
interaction is that the post-Reformation results simply reflect a reversion to the pre-Reformation
mean. The interaction for 1520–1549 of similar magnitude to the aggregated pre-Reformation in-
teraction does not alleviate this concern. However, observing an interaction for 1550–1599 that
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is nearly twice as large as the other two suggests that the post-Reformation increase in secular
sector construction in Protestant territories far exceeds mean reversion. We will further consider
concerns about pre-Reformation differences in construction between (eventually) Protestant and
Catholic regions in the analyses presented in the right-hand frames of Figure IX.
Finally, in the left-hand frame of Figure IX, panel C, we present all of our estimates from equa-
tions 5 and 6, but examining construction that specifically reflected the interests of secular lords:
namely, new palaces and administrative buildings.47 One can see that the patterns qualitatively
match those in the left-hand frame of Figure IX, panel B: somewhat greater construction of palaces
and administrative buildings in (eventually) Protestant territories prior to the Reformation (in this
case not statistically significantly so); a negative differential trend in palace and administrative
construction in the last decade before the Reformation in (eventually) Protestant territories; a re-
version to earlier differences in the 1520–1549 period; finally, a much larger, statistically significant
difference after 1550.
The left-hand frames of Figure IX thus broadly confirm the predictions of our conceptual
framework: following the Reformation, resources were differentially shifted away from church
purposes in Protestant territories (panel A). Political power and control of resources shifted to-
ward secular lords, a process which was consolidated after the Schmalkaldic War; this is reflected
in the significant increase in secular construction, and specifically the construction of palaces and
administrative buildings, after 1550 (panels B and C).
Still, the left-hand frames of Figure IX, panels A through C, raise several questions. First, one
might be concerned with the pre-Reformation differences in construction levels between Catholic
and (eventually) Protestant territories. Although there was not a trend toward the Reformation-
era patterns of construction activity just before 1520, it seems possible that some of the difference
between denominations in construction post-1520 reflects mean reversion to pre-Reformation dif-
ferences (or other unobserved territory differences associated with differential pre-Reformation
construction patterns). To address this concern, we next introduce controls that allow pre-Reformation
construction levels in a territory to affect post-Reformation outcomes very flexibly.
47These estimates simply use counts of palaces and administrative buildings—a subset of secular construction—as
outcomes in equations 5 and 6.
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We first allow for different construction patterns during the Reformation depending on the
stock of construction just prior to our analysis, including interactions between the total construc-
tion observed in a territory our data up to the 1470s and a full set of decade dummy variables. We
also allow pre-Reformation construction flows to affect Reformation-era construction, including
interactions between each territory’s level of construction in each pre-Reformation decade and a
full set of decade dummies. This absorbs all of the pre-Reformation differences in construction
in our analyses, and some of the post-Reformation variation, but makes our post-Reformation
comparisons close to ceteris paribus.
In the right-hand frames of Figure IX, panels A–C, we replicate the analyses from the left-hand
frames, but including these very flexible controls for pre-Reformation differences in territories’
construction. As noted, by design, there are no pre-Reformation differences in either construc-
tion levels or trends between (eventually) Protestant and Catholic territories. Reassuringly, the
Reformation-era patterns of reallocation observed in the left-hand frames are qualitatively pre-
served even including this very demanding set of controls. Most strikingly, secular construction
exhibits a statistically significant differential increase in Protestant regions during the 1550–1599
period. The 1.5 additional secular construction events per territory×decade and 0.75 palaces or
administrative buildings in Protestant regions between 1550 and 1599 represent a large increase
relative to pre-Reformation means of 2.2 and 1.4, respectively, and even relative to total construc-
tion, which averaged 4.7 events per territory×decade prior to 1520.
Up to now, our analysis has focused on the “extensive margin” of religious competition: com-
paring Protestant territories—where religious competition produced successful entry—with Catholic
territories. However, historical evidence suggests that within Catholic regions, religious competi-
tion was more intense along borders with Protestant territories (Ekelund et al., 2006); that is, there
was an “intensive margin” of religious competition as well.48 To the extent that the resource re-
allocation we observe following the Reformation was ultimately driven by religious competition
affecting the bargain between religious and secular elites, one would expect that the differences
between Protestant and Catholic regions seen in Figure IX should have primarily been driven by
48While there was variation in religious market contestability within Catholic regions, in Protestant regions all mar-
kets were (ex post successfully) contested.
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differences between Protestant territories and Catholic regions far from Protestant lands (i.e., those
Catholic regions experiencing less religious competition).
To examine this hypothesis, we conduct empirical exercises analogous to those presented in
the right-hand frames of Figure IX, panels A and B, but comparing Protestant territories to a split
sample of Catholic regions. The first, “high competition,” subsample comprises the set of Catholic
towns whose nearest town is known to have had a Protestant territorial lord. The second, “low
competition,” subsample comprises the set of Catholic towns whose nearest town is known to
have had a Catholic territorial lord. Note that we restrict this analysis to towns (whether Protestant
or Catholic) that do not border territories whose lord and religion are unknown to us. Hence this
analysis does not precisely aggregate to the results in Figure IX.
In Figure X, panel A, one can see that comparing Protestant regions’ construction patterns with
those in “high competition” Catholic regions, there is only a small difference in Reformation era
construction activity, with secular construction being slightly higher in the 1520–1549 period in
Protestant regions. In Figure X, panel B, one can see that Reformation era construction for secular
purposes was far greater in Protestant regions than in “low competition” Catholic regions far from
Protestant territories (particularly after 1550). These results suggest that religious competition
was indeed important both on the “extensive margin” of successful entry and on the “intensive
margin” of more contestable religious markets.
Another question about the pattern of reallocation we observe in Figure IX is whether our re-
sults are explained by the mis-classification of construction events. Two types of mis-classification
are of particular concern: first, while we assign construction for social welfare purposes to the “sec-
ular” category, hospitals and schools were often attached to churches and were staffed by church
personnel, making their assignment ambiguous. Second, military construction, which makes up
a component of our secular category as well as a component of our count of events reflecting the
interests of secular lords, may have served religious purposes in an era of religious conflict.
To more closely examine the types of construction events that drive the observed reallocation,
Figure XI presents evidence on secular construction by specific purpose, in Protestant territories.
One can see in the figure that the overall pattern of secularization in Protestant regions is not
driven by the ambiguous social welfare or military construction events. Rather, the increased
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construction in the secular sector is driven by palaces and administrative buildings, precisely the
categories that reflect the increased power and wealth of secular authorities.49
Interpretation of cause and effect — An overarching question regarding our analysis is whether
the reallocation we observe reflects a causal effect of the Reformation or merely the effects of unob-
served differences across territories. Perhaps territories that became Protestant were already eco-
nomically or culturally different prior to the Reformation, with this underlying difference driving
both the Reformation and the reallocation of resources we document. Evidence presented thus far
supports a causal interpretation: territories and universities that would become Protestant exhibit
no significant differences in human and physical capital investment trends prior to the Reforma-
tion. We observe no indication that these territories would have diverged had the Reformation
not occurred.
One might remain concerned about time-varying, territory-specific unobservables that drove
both the adoption of Protestantism and resource reallocation. For example, a large literature doc-
uments a wave of urban support for the Reformation across Germany and that cities (as opposed
to towns) were the locations where reformist ideas and constituencies developed (Ozment, 1975;
Hamm, 1994).50 This suggests a possible alternative theory: just at the time of the Reformation, ur-
ban areas may have experienced socioeconomic change that drove both the Reformation and the
economic change we observe. However, our findings are not driven by large cities. In Figure XII,
one can see a pattern of reallocation from church to secular construction in both small Protestant
towns and large Protestant cities.
A final concern could be that economic shocks hit particular regions, shifting both the likeli-
hood of the adoption Protestantism and the incentives for reallocating resources toward secular
purposes. To explore this possibility, we narrow our focus to three territories where the timing of
49We also consider the possibility that while the count of church building in Protestant territories shrank after the
Reformation, perhaps church building sizes increased. We collect data on church sizes from the 124-volume series
Denkmaltopographie Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Dellwing, 1988/2011) and its various predecessor series (a full set of
references is provided in the online appendix) which provides us with information on the area of 14% of the new church
buildings we observe in eventually-Protestant territories between 1470 and 1600. We find that church areas increased
slightly, but statistically insignificantly from the pre-Reformation era to the post-Reformation era: from around 450
square meters to around 495 in the sample of churches for which we have data (see Online Appendix Table A3).
50As Brady (2009, p. 161) observes, “cities became the nurseries and schoolhouses of religious change, it is hardly
going too far to say that the Protestant reformation was, at least in its youth, ‘an urban event’.” This is also consistent
with the Tawney hypothesis (Tawney, 1926).
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religious change was unrelated to local economic conditions. To be precise, we study three set-
tings in which the timing of religious change was driven by the exogenous timing of ruler change.
We examine evidence on the change of rulers and religion in the Electorate of Brandenburg, the
Duchy of Saxony, and the Duchy of Wu¨rttemberg.51 In these three territories, an unobserved
territory-by-time economic shock does not explain the timing of the adoption of Protestantism,
but we observe the same pattern of resource reallocation coinciding with religious change that we
observe throughout Germany.
Electorate of Brandenburg — The Electorate of Brandenburg at the time of the Reformation was
ruled by Joachim I (Nestor), who, with his brother Albert, personified the corrupt practices that
Luther criticized in his theses. In particular, Joachim I and his Hohenzollern family purchased
the archbishopric of Mainz for Albert using loans guaranteed by future sales of indulgences. A
staunch Catholic, Joachim I had his son, Joachim II (Hector) sign an inheritance contract in which
Joachim II promised to remain Catholic. One can see in the top panel of Figure XIII that during
the period of Catholic rule (until the death of Joachim I, in 1535), the Electorate of Brandenburg
experienced very few monastery closures and saw very little increase in secular construction.
However, after the death of Joachim I in 1535, Joachim II reneged on his pledge to remain
Catholic. In the top panel of Figure XIII, one can see that shortly after Joachim II took power, the
political shock produced a sharp increase in monastery closure, and, as measured by construction
activity, a shift of resources toward secular and away from church uses.
Duchy of Saxony — The Duchy of Saxony was ruled in the early 16th century by Duke Georg,
an ardent Catholic. In 1539, Georg’s last remaining (Catholic) son, Frederick died. Knowing that
his Protestant brother Heinrich was in line to inherit the Duchy if he died, Georg attempted to
secure the inheritance for the Catholic Ferdinand (who would eventually become Holy Roman
Emperor). Georg initiated the legal process necessary to transfer his inheritance to Ferdinand;
however, before this could be completed, Georg himself died in 1539, leading to the accession of
Heinrich and the conversion of the Duchy to Lutheranism.
In the middle panel of Figure XIII, one can see some monastery closure and some shift in con-
51Note that these territories are not unusual in the intensity of monastery closure or the timing of the adoption of the
Reformation, as can be seen in Table II.
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struction away from the church sector during the Reformation era even under the Catholic Georg.
However, at precisely the moment when the Protestant Heinrich took power (marked by a ver-
tical red line), monastery closure sharply accelerated, and resources were allocated differentially
toward secular and away from church uses.
Duchy of Wu¨rttemberg — In 1519, Duke Ulrich was exiled from the Duchy of Wu¨rttemberg after
killing the husband of his mistress. Control of the Duchy was given to the Catholic future emperor
Ferdinand. In 1523, Ulrich adopted the Protestant faith and attempted to retake the Duchy on the
back of the Peasants’ Revolt, but this attempt failed. One can see in the bottom panel of Figure XIII
that in the first decade after the Reformation, under the Catholic Frederick, there is almost no
monastery closure in the Duchy of Wu¨rttemberg, and very little shifting of construction toward
secular purposes.
But in 1534, supported by his friend, the Protestant Philip of Hesse, the Duchy was restored
to Ulrich. Immediately thereafter, Ulrich expropriated many of the Duchy’s monasteries; by 1535,
one-third of the Duchy’s farmland was transferred from the monasteries into Ulrich’s possession
(Ocker, 2010, pp. 55–56). One can see in the botton panel of Figure XIII that exactly at this time
secular construction begins to rise and overtakes religious construction in the Duchy.
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IV CONCLUSION
We find that the introduction of religious competition during the Protestant Reformation had an
unintended consequence: the reallocation of economic resources from religious uses to secular
ones. We argue that to understand how economic secularization resulted from the rise of a re-
ligious movement, one must consider the interaction of religious and political elites in a market
for religiously derived political legitimacy. Considering this market, one indeed expects that the
introduction of religious competition will shift political and economic power from religious elites
to secular rulers, producing the secularization we observe.
Our analysis brings rich empirical evidence to some of the major intellectual debates in the
social sciences. First, we reinforce Tawney’s (1926) emphasis on important pre-conditions for the
Reformation: specifically, the relative independence of secular rulers from religious institutions,
and conflict between secular and religious elites over Europe’s growing wealth play a crucial role
in our conceptual framework. However, we also provide evidence that the Reformation marked
a decisive break from existing patterns of resource allocation: far from being a continuation of
pre-existing trends, the Reformation played a causal role in reshaping Europe’s political economy.
We identify a significant resource reallocation resulting from the Reformation, but provide a very
different mechanism for long-run economic consequences from the cultural channel emphasized
by Weber (1904/05).
Our findings also provide the beginnings of an empirical bridge between the Reformation
and consequences for long-run growth studied by numerous scholars (Weber, 1904/05; Becker
and Woessmann, 2009; Kuran, 2011; Rubin, 2017). Several extensions of this bridge are plausible.
First, the shifting of power to secular lords and the weakening of religious elites—particularly in
Protestant regions—may have affected policy choices and legal institutions; this mechanism has
been emphasized with respect to corporate law and usury restrictions (Kuran, 2011; Rubin, 2017).
Both allocational and institutional secularization strengthened territorial rulers and might have
contributed to the development of early modern states of greater state capacity (Besley and Pers-
son, 2009, 2010; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015). Finally, both the reallocation of resources (particularly
upper tail human capital) and the weakening of religious elites, might have set in motion a process
39
of cultural and intellectual change that culminated in the enlightenment, the scientific revolution,
and modern economic growth (Mokyr, 2005, 2017). While these links extend beyond the scope of
our study, we believe they deserve further attention.
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Figure I: Construction Activity Around the Time of the Reformation
Cumulative construction events by sector and sub-sector, over time. Left-hand panel shows the cumulative number of
new construction events in the religious and secular sectors in Germany. Right-hand panel disaggregates the secular
sector construction events into mutually exclusive and exhaustive sub-sectors. The “Administrative” sub-sector in-
cludes courts, town halls, and customs houses. The “Economic” sub-sector comprises private sector construction, such
as mills, restaurants, and breweries. The “Welfare” sub-sector includes schools and hospitals. The “Palaces” sub-sector
includes castles and hunting lodges. The “Military” sub-sector includes barracks and arsenals. Town-level construction
data come from 2,256 town entries in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch and are aggregated for all of Germany. Vertical line marks
1517, when Martin Luther circulated his 95 Theses.
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Figure II: Monasteries and Monastery Closure During the Reformation in Germany
Map of all 3,094 monasteries in Ju¨rgensmeier and Schwerdtfeger (2005–2008). White circles indicate monasteries that
remain open throughout the time period under study. Black triangles indicate monasteries that were opened prior to
the Reformation but closed between 1517 and 1600. Territorial boundaries come from Nu¨ssli (2008).
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Figure III: Monastery Closure in Catholic and Eventually-Protestant Germany
Average number of monasteries within 25 km of 1,541 towns (558 Catholic, 983 Protestant) included in the Deutsches
Sta¨dtebuch that are matched to a religious denomination. Assignment of towns to religious denominations is done by
matching each town to its territorial lord identified in the Euratlas for 1500, and using the territorial lord’s religion as
coded by Cantoni (2012). Vertical line marks 1517, when Martin Luther circulated his 95 Theses.
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Figure IV: Careers among Eventually-Protestant and Catholic University Graduates
Shares of first job by sector by (eventual) university denomination. Figure shows the share of first jobs in secular and
religious economic sectors (which are exhaustive and mutually exclusive) among individuals with occupations listed
in the Repertorium Academicum Germanicum, by an individual’s year of first university degree attainment and by the
degree-granting university’s eventual denomination (smoothed using an 11-year moving average). Occupations are
classified into economic sectors using the Thesaurus Professionum (Marburg University, 2015). Vertical line marks 1517,
when Martin Luther circulated his 95 Theses.
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Figure V: Effects of the Reformation on Careers (Difference in Differences Estimates)
Regression estimates of sorting into occupational sectors over time and by university denomination. Panel A presents
the differential probability that graduates from eventually-Protestant universities take a first job in church occupations,
relative to graduates from universities that remain Catholic. Panel B presents the differential probability that graduates
from eventually-Protestant universities take a first job in administrative occupations, relative to graduates from univer-
sities that remain Catholic. Regressions are estimated using OLS at the student level, for 2,408 students, and include
university and decade fixed effects. Decadal regression coefficients of interest are interactions between an “eventually
Protestant university” dummy variable and decade fixed effects and are estimated relative to the omitted interaction
with the 1510–1519 decade. In the aggregate specification, coefficients of interest are interactions between an “eventu-
ally Protestant university” dummy variable and a 1480–1509 dummy (Panel A: β = 0.02, p = 0.52; Panel B: β = −0.01,
p = 0.56), and between an “eventually Protestant university” dummy variable and a 1520–1549 dummy (Panel A:
β = −0.12, p = 0.02; Panel B: β = 0.05, p = 0.10), estimated relative to the omitted interaction with the 1510–1519
decade. Coefficient estimates on the decade interactions are plotted as dots with their 90% confidence intervals indi-
cated with vertical lines. Coefficient estimates on the aggregate interactions are shown with horizontal lines, and their
90% confidence intervals are indicated as boxes. Standard errors are clustered at the university×decade level.
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Figure VI: Degrees Granted in Eventually-Protestant and Catholic Universities
Shares of theology and secular degrees granted by (eventual) university denomination (smoothed using an 11-year
moving average). Theology and secular degree categories are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. The secular degree
category includes degrees in the arts, law, and medicine. Data come from the Repertorium Academicum Germanicum
for degrees granted through 1550 and own data collection (consulting Bauch, 1897; Erler, 1895, 1897, 1909; Eulenburg,
1904; Kleineidam, 1983; Leinweber, 1991; Ru¨egg, 1996; Steinmeyer, 1912) for degrees granted from 1550 through 1600.
Vertical line marks 1517, when Martin Luther circulated his 95 Theses.
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Figure VII: Effects of the Reformation on University Degrees (Difference in Differences Estimates)
Regression estimates of human capital investments across fields over time and by university denomination. Panel A
presents the differential probability that graduates from eventually-Protestant universities earned a degree in theology,
relative to graduates from universities that remain Catholic. Panel B presents the differential probability that graduates
from eventually-Protestant universities earned degrees in law or the arts, relative to graduates from universities that
remain Catholic. Regressions are estimated using OLS at the student level, for 10,022 students, and include university
and decade fixed effects. Decadal regression coefficients of interest are interactions between an “eventually Protes-
tant university” dummy variable and decade fixed effects and are estimated relative to the omitted interaction with
the 1510–1519 decade. In the aggregate specification, coefficients of interest are interactions between an “eventually
Protestant university” dummy variable and a 1480–1509 dummy (Panel A: β = 0.01, p = 0.65; Panel B: β = −0.00,
p = 0.89), and between an “eventually Protestant university” dummy variable and a 1520–1549 dummy (Panel A:
β = −0.05, p = 0.02; Panel B: β = 0.02, p = 0.07), estimated relative to the omitted interaction with the 1510–1519
decade. Coefficient estimates on the decade interactions are plotted as dots with their 90% confidence intervals indi-
cated with vertical lines. Coefficient estimates on the aggregate interactions are shown with horizontal lines, and their
90% confidence intervals are indicated as boxes. Standard errors are clustered at the university×decade level.
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Figure VIII: Religious and Secular Construction in Eventually-Protestant and Catholic Germany
Construction starts per town×year disaggregated by sector for 983 towns in (eventually) Protestant and 558 towns
in (remaining) Catholic territories (smoothed using an 11-year moving average). Town-level construction data come
from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch. Assignment of towns to religious denominations is done by matching each town to its
territorial lord identified in the Euratlas for 1500, and using the territorial lord’s religion as coded by Cantoni (2012).
Vertical line marks 1517, when Martin Luther circulated his 95 Theses.
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Figure IX: Effects of the Reformation on Construction (Difference in Differences Estimates)
Regression estimates of construction events in a territory×decade by sector, over time and by territorial religious denomination for
35 territories. Panel A presents differential counts of church sector construction events in eventually-Protestant territories, relative
to territories that remain Catholic. Panel B presents differential counts of secular sector construction events in eventually-Protestant
territories, relative to territories that remain Catholic. Panel C presents differential counts of palace or administrative building con-
struction events in eventually-Protestant territories, relative to territories that remain Catholic. Regressions are estimated using OLS at
the territory×decade and include territory and decade fixed effects. The right-hand frames include interactions between the stock of a
territory’s construction in 1470 and a full set of decade dummies, as well as interactions between each territory’s level of construction
in each pre-Reformation decade and a full set of decade dummies. Decadal regression coefficients of interest are interactions between
an “eventually Protestant territory” dummy variable and decade fixed effects and are estimated relative to the omitted interaction
with the 1510–1519 decade. In the aggregate specification, coefficients of interest are interactions between an “eventually Protestant
territory” dummy variable and: (i) a 1480–1509 dummy (Panel A: β = −0.76, p = 0.20; Panel B: β = 0.96, p = 0.01; Panel C: β = 0.54,
p = 0.11); (ii) a 1520–1549 dummy (Panel A, left: β = −1.49, p = 0.11; Panel A, right: β = −0.21, p = 0.33; Panel B, left: β = 0.81,
p = 0.28; Panel B, right: β = 0.32, p = 0.58; Panel C, left: β = 0.52, p = 0.42; Panel C, right: β = 0.08, p = 0.84); and, (iii) and a
1550–1599 dummy (Panel A, left: β = −1.68, p = 0.05; Panel A, right: β = −0.65, p = 0.33; Panel B, left: β = 2.06, p = 0.07; Panel
B, right: β = 1.51, p = 0.02; Panel C, left: β = 1.47, p = 0.06; Panel C, right: β = 0.72, p = 0.05), estimated relative to the omitted
interaction with the 1510–1519 decade. Coefficient estimates on the decade interactions are plotted as dots with their 90% confidence
intervals indicated with vertical lines. Coefficient estimates on the aggregate interactions are shown with horizontal lines, and their
90% confidence intervals are indicated as boxes. Standard errors are clustered at the territory level.
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Figure X: Heterogeneous Effects of the Reformation: Intensity of Religious Competition
Regression estimates of construction events in a territory×decade by sector, over time, by territorial religious denomi-
nation, and by intensity of religious competition. Panel A includes 26 territories and Panel B includes 29 territories. The
left-hand frame of Panel A presents differential counts of church sector construction events in eventually-Protestant re-
gions, relative to regions that remain Catholic and that are on the border with Protestant territories. The right-hand
frame of Panel A presents differential counts of secular sector construction events in eventually-Protestant regions,
relative to regions that remain Catholic and that are on the border with Protestant territories. Panel B presents anal-
ogous analyses, but presenting differential counts of construction events in eventually-Protestant regions, relative to
regions that remain Catholic and that are not on the border with Protestant territories. Catholic regions are defined
at the town level based on the religious denomination of the nearest town (Protestant nearest town implies border re-
gion, Catholic nearest town implies non-border regions, and a nearest town with religion unknown is excluded from
the analysis). Regressions are estimated using OLS at the territory×decade and include territory and decade fixed ef-
fects. The right-hand frames include interactions between the stock of a territory’s construction in 1470 and a full set of
decade dummies, as well as interactions between each territory’s level of construction in each pre-Reformation decade
and a full set of decade dummies. Decadal regression coefficients of interest are interactions between an “eventually
Protestant territory” dummy variable and decade fixed effects and are estimated relative to the omitted interaction
with the 1510–1519 decade. In the aggregate specification, coefficients of interest are interactions between an “eventu-
ally Protestant territory” dummy variable and: (i) a 1520–1549 dummy (Panel A, left: β = −0.01, p = 0.95; Panel A,
right: β = 0.53, p = 0.08; Panel B, left: β = −0.03, p = 0.92; Panel B, right: β = 0.62, p = 0.07) and (ii) a 1550–1599
dummy (Panel A, left: β = −0.20, p = 0.22; Panel A, right: β = 0.13, p = 0.70; Panel B, left: β = −.02, p = 0.96;
Panel B, right: β = 1.24, p = 0.02), estimated relative to the omitted interaction with the 1510–1519 decade. Coefficient
estimates on the decade interactions are plotted as dots with their 90% confidence intervals indicated with vertical lines.
Coefficient estimates on the aggregate interactions are shown with horizontal lines, and their 90% confidence intervals
are indicated as boxes. Standard errors are clustered at the territory level.
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Figure XI: Secular Construction by Purpose in Eventually-Protestant Germany
Cumulative number of new secular sector construction events, disaggregated by specific purpose, for 983 towns in
(eventually) Protestant territories. Secular sector construction events are disaggregated the into mutually exclusive
and exhaustive sub-sectors. The “Administrative” sub-sector includes courts, town halls, and customs houses. The
“Economic” sub-sector comprises private sector construction, such as mills, restaurants, and breweries. The “Welfare”
sub-sector includes schools and hospitals. The “Palaces” sub-sector includes castles and hunting lodges. The “Military”
sub-sector includes barracks and arsenals. Town-level construction data come from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch. Assign-
ment of towns to religious denominations is done by matching each town to its territorial lord identified in the Euratlas
for 1500, and using the territorial lord’s religion as coded by Cantoni (2012). Vertical line marks 1517, when Martin
Luther circulated his 95 Theses.
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Figure XII: Heterogeneous Effects of the Reformation: Town Size
Construction starts per city×year or town×year disaggregated by sector for cities and towns in (eventually) Protestant
and (remaining) Catholic territories (smoothed using an 11-year moving average). Town-level construction data come
from the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch. Assignment of towns to religious denominations is done by matching each town to its
territorial lord identified in the Euratlas for 1500, and using the territorial lord’s religion as coded by Cantoni (2012).
“Cities” for the purpose of this figure are the subset of towns in the dataset (75 Catholic, 121 Protestant) with population
data available in Bairoch et al. (1988); “towns” for the purpose of this figure are the complementary subset of towns
(483 Catholic, 862 Protestant). Vertical line marks 1517, when Martin Luther circulated his 95 Theses.
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Figure XIII: Effects of Reformation: Territorial Case Studies
Monastery closure and construction in three territories: Brandenburg, Ducal Saxony, and Wu¨rttemberg. Each figure
shows the fraction of monasteries closed and the number of construction events in the church and secular sectors
(construction events are shown as 11-year moving averages). The circulation of Luther’s theses in 1517 is marked in all
figures, as are the dates of each change in territorial lord leading to the adoption of Protestantism: 1535 for Electorate
of Brandenburg, 1539 for the Duchy of Saxony, and 1534 for the Duchy of Wu¨rttemberg.
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Table I: Timeline of Major Reformation Events in Germany, 1517–1648
Date Event
1517 Luther circulates 95 theses from Wittenberg
1521 Edict of Worms condemns Luther as a heretic
1530 Formation of Schmalkaldic League of Protestant princes
1546–1547 Schmalkaldic War
1555 Peace of Augsburg establishes cuius regio, eius religio principle
1618–1648 30 Years’ War
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Table III: The Association Between Fields of Study and Occupations
% with % with
Type of university graduate No. of individuals church job administration job
At least one theology degree 527 90% 33%
No theology degree 2,716 53% 25%
Statistical significance < 1% < 1%
At least one arts or law degree 3,099 58% 27%
No arts or law degree 144 92% 11%
Statistical significance < 1% < 1%
Table examines the relationship between field of study and occupational sector among 3,243 individuals
earning degrees between 1480 and 1550, inclusive, and who have at least one occupation recorded in the
Repertorium Academicum Germanicum dataset. Careers in the church and administrative sectors are deter-
mined using the Thesaurus Professionum (Marburg University, 2015).
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SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX —
FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
ADDITIONAL REFERENCES
The Denkmaltopographie Bundesrepublik Deutschland cited in the main text (Dellwing 1988/2011)
was preceded by separate series of volumes listing and describing all historical buildings in the
single states of Germany. We looked up sizes of church buildings in these volumes as well, to
extend and complement the analysis based on the Denkmaltopographie Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Die Kunstdenkma¨ler des Grossherzogtums Baden, 15 volumes, Tu¨bingen: Mohr, 1887–1913.
Die Kunstdenkma¨ler von Bayern, 112 volumes, Mu¨nchen: Oldenbourg, 1892–1972.
Berlin und seine Bauten, 3 volumes, Berlin: Ernst, 1877–1896.
Die Kunstdenkma¨ler der Provinz Brandenburg, 6 volumes, Berlin: Dt. Kunstverlag, 1907–1921.
Bau- und Kunstdenkma¨ler des Herzogthums Braunschweig, 5 volumes, Wolfenbu¨ttel: Zwissler, 1896–
1910.
Die Kunstdenkma¨ler der Provinz Hannover, 26 volumes, Hannover: Provinzialverwaltung, 1899–
1939.
Kunstdenkma¨ler im Großherzogthum Hessen, 5 volumes, Darmstadt: Bergstraesser, 1885–1898.
Die Baudenkma¨ler des Regierungsbezirks Wiesbaden, 6 volumes, Frankfurt am Main: Keller, 1902–
1921.
Die Bau- und Kunstdenkma¨ler in den Hohenzollern’schen Landen, Stuttgart: Neff, 1896.
Kunst- und Geschichts-Denkma¨ler des Großherzogthums Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 5 volumes, Schwerin:
Ba¨rensprung, 1896–1902.
Kunst- und Geschichts-Denkma¨ler des Freistaates Mecklenburg-Strelitz, 2 volumes, Neubrandenburg:
Bru¨nslow, 1921–1934.
Bau- und Kunstdenkma¨ler des Herzogtums Oldenburg, 5 volumes, Oldenburg, 1896–1909.
Die Bau- und Kunstdenkma¨ler der Provinz Ostpreußen, 9 volumes, Ko¨nigsberg, 1891–1899.
Die Baudenkmale in der Pfalz, Ludwigshafen, 1884–1897.
Bau- und Kunstdenkma¨ler der Provinz Pommern, 24 volumes, Stettin, 1881–1909.
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Die Kunstdenkma¨ler der Rheinprovinz, 20 volumes, Du¨sseldorf, 1891–1937.
Die Kunstdenkma¨ler der Provinz Sachsen, 33 volumes, Leipzig, 1838–1850.
Denkmalverzeichnis Sachsen-Anhalt, 33 volumes, Halle a. d. Saale, 1879–1923.
Verzeichniss der Kunstdenkma¨ler der Provinz Schlesien, 6 volumes, Breslau, 1886–1902.
Die Bau- und Kunstdenkma¨ler der Provinz Schleswig-Holstein, 6 volumes, Kiel, 1887–1925.
Bau- und Kunstdenkma¨ler Thu¨ringens, 24 volumes, 1888–1928.
Die Bau- und Kunstdenkma¨ler von Westfalen, 38 volumes, Mu¨nster, 1881–1913.
Die Bau- und Kunstdenkma¨ler der Provinz Westpreußen, 14 volumes, Danzig, 1884–1919.
Die Kunst- und Altertums-Denkmale im Ko¨nigreich Wu¨rttemberg, 4 volumes, 1893–1928.
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Figure A1: Number of theology and secular degrees granted (yearly data and 11-year moving average). Theology
and secular (arts, law, and medicine) degree categories are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Data come from the
Repertorium Academicum Germanicum for degrees granted through 1550 and own data collection (consulting Bauch,
1897; Erler, 1895, 1897, 1909; Eulenburg, 1904; Kleineidam, 1983; Leinweber, 1991; Ru¨egg, 1996; Steinmeyer, 1912) for
degrees granted from 1550 through 1600. Panel A presents all available data. Panel B excludes University of Cologne
data from the entire time period under consideration because data on degrees granted are unavailable after 1550. Panel
C presents data from eventually-Protestant universities only.
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Figure A2: Number of German universities (total and Protestant only) within our sample. Adop-
tion of Protestantism is coded based on Sehling (1902-2013), Spitz (1981), Grendler (2004), and
Naragon (2006).
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Table A1: Territories and assignment to (eventual) religion
Territory Protestant Territory Protestant
Anhalt 1537 Lorraine —
Baden 1555 Mainz —
Bavaria-Landshut — Mecklenburg 1549
Bavaria-Munich — Nassau 1542
Bohemia — Palatinate 1546
Brandenburg 1539 Passau —
Brunswick-Calenberg 1584 Poland —
Brunswick-Lu¨neburg 1529 Pomerania 1534
Brunswick-Wolfenbu¨ttel 1568 Ruppin 1539
Burgundian Netherlands — Salzburg —
Cleves-Mark — Saxony (Ducal) 1539
Cologne — Saxony (Electorate) 1527
Denmark 1536 Small States of the HRE .
East Frisia 1535 Swiss Confederacy .
Guelders — Trier —
Habsburg Monarchy — Upper Palatinate 1546
Hesse 1526 Wu¨rttemberg 1534
Ju¨lich-Berg —
Table lists territories present in the Euratlas (Nu¨ssli, 2008) for 1500, and their
assignment to the territorial lord’s (eventual) religion through the dates of
introduction of the Reformation as in Cantoni (2012). Note: Cities matched
by the Euratlas digital maps to “Small States of the HRE” and to the “Swiss
Confederacy” are discarded in our analysis. Territories, and their names, re-
flect borders as of 1500: Bavaria-Landshut and Bavaria-Munich, e.g., merge
after the War of the Succession of Landshut (1503–1505).
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Table A2: Degrees awarded by level and subject
Subject Bachelor’s License Master’s Doctor Total
Arts 17608 4163 15179 450 37400
Law 1210 892 1 896 2999
Medicine 239 211 7 486 943
Theology 2085 767 38 898 3788
Across subject total 21142 6033 15225 2730 45130
Data come from the Repertorium Academicum Germanicum.
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Table A3: The Size of Church Construction Projects in Protestant Territories
Pre: 1470-1517 Post: 1518-1600 p-value
n Mean SD n Mean SD diff. in means
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All New Church Construction
Indicator: Church Size Recorded 125 0.18 0.38 88 0.08 0.27 0.03
Where Church Size is Recorded
Church Size in Square Meters 22 453.24 302.43 7 494.93 196.42 0.68
This table presents summary statistics on physical sizes of new churches built in German territories that ulti-
mately adopted Protestantism. We study new church construction in cities and towns recorded over the period
1470–1600 in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch. We obtain data on church sizes by finding each new church in the 124-
volume series Denkmaltopographie Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Dellwing, 1988/2011), which provides a record of
cultural monuments in Germany. The first row provides summary statistics for the binary outcome indicat-
ing whether a given church construction event mentioned in the Deutsches Sta¨dtebuch is recorded with original
floor dimensions in the Denkmaltopographie Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1 = ‘yes’, 0 = ‘no’). The second row pro-
vides summary statistics on church sizes for construction events on which the Denkmaltopographie Bundesrepublik
Deutschland provides information on the original size of church buildings. Church sizes are measured in square
meters, calculated as the sum of the church nave area and church choir area, using data on floor plan widths and
lengths.
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